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DISASTER TRADEOFFS: THE DOUBTFUL 
CASE FOR PUBLIC NECESSITY 
Susan S. Kuo* 
Abstract: When government takes private property for a public purpose, 
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires just compensa-
tion. Courts, however, have long recognized an exception to takings law 
for the destruction of private property when necessary to prevent a public 
disaster. In those circumstances, unless the state accepts an obligation to 
pay damages, individuals must bear their own losses. This Article con-
tends that the public necessity defense should be rejected. First, the tight 
time frame and limited options typical in a disaster response threaten to 
obscure the crucial role of government in planning for disasters and 
mitigating vulnerability. Second, and more fundamentally, the deliberate 
infliction of harm remains wrongful, even if all available alternatives are 
worse and the situation could not have been averted or ameliorated 
through proper advance planning. A just compensation rule—whether 
instituted via statute or judicial reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause—would preserve the government’s emergency powers 
while reaffirming the rule of law and advancing the interests of social jus-
tice. 
Introduction 
 Although the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides 
that “private property” shall not “be taken for public use, without just 
compensation,”1 the common law defense of public necessity justifies 
“the destruction of ‘real and personal property, in cases of actual neces-
sity, to prevent the spreading of a fire’ or to forestall other grave threats 
to the lives and property of others.”2 In such cases, an actor need not 
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1 U.S. Const. amend. V. Just compensation has been interpreted to mean fair market 
value. See United States v. Fifty Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25 (1984). 
2 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n.16 (1992) (citing Bowditch v. 
Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1879); see also John Alan Cohan, Private and Public Necessity and 
the Violation of Property Rights, 83 N.D. L. Rev. 651, 653–56 (2007) (discussing the common 
law principle of public necessity and noting that it can justify invasion or destruction of 
private property). 
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pay for damage done to private property.3 As one court put it, “the in-
dividual must yield to the community and accept his losses philosophi-
cally.”4 To ameliorate the harsh consequences of a common law rule 
that forces a few individuals to bear costs for the benefit of society, most 
states have enacted statutes to compensate victims, at least under some 
circumstances.5 The federal government, however, has steadfastly re-
fused to acknowledge any such obligation.6 
 This Article contends that the public necessity defense should not 
apply to losses occasioned by disaster response.7 First, disaster harm 
typically reflects prior government choices. With all due regard for the 
time pressure and constrained choices that make disaster response dif-
ficult, it is important to ask whether the government failed to engage in 
appropriate planning and mitigation efforts that would have reduced 
disaster vulnerability. If so, the exigencies of a disaster should not ab-
solve the government from responsibility when it invades and destroys 
private property.8 For example, many experts believe that the U.S. For-
est Service’s long-standing policy of suppressing fires has upset stable 
ecological patterns in the Southwest and created the conditions for re-
cent wildfire emergencies.9 In one recent case, involving damage to 
properties from fires intentionally set by the Forest Service to combat a 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 & n.16. Although public officials are more likely to be in a 
position to make such tradeoffs, the defense applies as well to private individuals who act 
to protect the public. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 262 cmt. b (1965). 
4 Dunn v. McCoy, 113 F.2d 587, 589 (3d Cir. 1940). 
5 See infra notes 47–53 and accompanying text. 
6 See, e.g., TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 98, 98, 101–02 (2012) (dismissing 
a takings claim for damages after the U.S. Forest Service “intentionally lit fires in order to 
manage a group of wildfires”); Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 48, 56 
(2012) (dismissing a suit in which the plaintiffs claimed that the release of floodwaters consti-
tuted a taking). 
7 Specifically, the Article’s focus is natural disasters; this Article does not consider addi-
tional issues that might be implicated in the context of warfare or other intentional disas-
ters. Nor does this Article address whether the public necessity defense should continue to 
protect individuals who damage private property while acting as Good Samaritans for the 
benefit of the community. 
8 See infra notes 64–141 and accompanying text. 
9 See Christopher Joyce, How the Smokey Bear Effect Led to Raging Wildfires, NPR (Aug. 23, 
2012 6:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/23/159373691/how-the-smokey-bear-effect-
led-to-raging-wildfires?sc=17&f=1001 (quoting Craig Allen, a research ecologist with the 
U.S. Geological Survey, New Mexico, who compared areas in which fires have been sup-
pressed to “caskets of fuel” and noted that “[g]unpowder has been building up in these 
things for a century, and now it’s dangerous to try to defuse”); Christopher Joyce, Why Forest-
Killing Megafires Are the New Normal, NPR (Aug. 23, 2012 2:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/ 
08/23/159373770/the-new-normal-for-wildfires-forest-killing-megablazes (noting that, belat-
edly, the “Forest Service has changed its longstanding policy of ‘no fires’ [because] [i]t real-
ized that the fuel buildup was dangerous”). 
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wildfire, a court found that “the government is not liable when it de-
stroys property ‘[t]o prevent the spreading of a fire.’”10 Although the 
plaintiffs alleged that the background conditions requiring the con-
trolled burn stemmed from the Forest Service’s misguided approach to 
forest management, the court failed to consider the possibility that the 
Forest Service was responsible for the conditions that had made the 
wildfire so dangerous.11 
 Second, and more fundamentally, the public necessity defense 
rests upon a consequentialist view of moral obligation.12 According to 
this view, whether an action is wrongful depends upon the anticipated 
consequences measured in terms of aggregate utility. Yet, tradeoffs that 
involve the deliberate infliction of harm—sacrificing the few to spare 
the many—remain wrongful even if the available alternatives are worse. 
For instance, when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) 
opened spillways along the Mississippi River in the spring of 2011, in-
undating farmland in Mississippi, Missouri, and parts of southeast Lou-
isiana, it was of little consolation to the flooded rural communities that 
a threat to population centers downriver had thereby been averted.13 
 A just compensation rule—whether instituted through statutory 
abrogation of the public necessity doctrine or judicial reinterpretation 
                                                                                                                      
10 TrinCo Inv. Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 101 (citing Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 
261 U.S. 502, 508 (1923)). 
11 See id. at 101–02. 
12 See Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil,” 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 44 
(2010) (discussing the cost-benefit calculations of the consequentialist approach and its 
focus on the outcome of any given action); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Case of the 
Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1913, 1914 (1999) (arguing that like “all of 
the lesser-evil justifications, necessity is openly utilitarian”). 
13 See Melanie Eversley & Rick Jervis, Missouri Farmers Return to “Ocean,” USA Today, May 
12, 2011, at 3A; see also Melanie Eversley, Mo. Farmers Return to Lands Ruined by Blown Levee, 
USA Today (May 12, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011- 
05-11-farmers-return-to-flooded-fields-missouri_n.htm (quoting a Missouri farmer who said, 
“I feel we were sacrificial lambs in this . . . . They have treated us much more cruelly than 
Mother Nature has ever done.”). 
For example, one pending class action comprised of Louisiana residents seeks to estab-
lish that the Army Corps’s destruction of levees was a taking entitling the residents to just 
compensation for their losses. See First Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, Quebedeaux v. 
United States, No. 11-389L (Fed. Cl. Sept. 21, 2011) (alleging “intentional diversion of flood 
water from the Mississippi River into the Atchafalaya River basin through the Morganza 
Floodway,” thereby damaging or destroying the plaintiffs’ property); see also Second 
Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, Big Oak Farms, 105 Fed. Cl. 48 (No. 1:11-CV-00275-
NBF) (seeking just compensation “for the taking of property owned by them . . . . when the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers elected to operate the Birds Point-New Madrid 
Floodway by destroying with explosives large portions of the frontline levee thereby inundat-
ing and destroying crops, property, businesses, buildings, and infrastructure with flood waters 
and accompanying sand and gravel”). 
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of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause—would preserve the federal 
government’s latitude to respond to disasters in the public interest.14 
Individual property owners, however, would not be forced to subsidize 
collective benefits enjoyed by others.15 Indeed, requiring the state to 
compensate individuals for economic loss would provide some assur-
ance that disaster tradeoffs were meant to maximize aggregate welfare 
and not to protect powerful constituencies.16 Moreover, because disas-
ter harms register preexisting conditions of social inequality, disaster 
law and policy cannot be separated from broader questions of social 
justice. In sum, compensating harms caused by disaster tradeoffs has 
practical and moral advantages. 
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains how the common 
law defense of public necessity shields the government from liability for 
actions taken during disaster response that would otherwise constitute a 
taking of private property for a public purpose.17 Part II uses the “trolley 
problem” scenario from moral philosophy to uncover the justificatory 
framework for public necessity, and contends that the analysis should 
also encompass a broader understanding of the causal factors underly-
                                                                                                                      
14 In other words, the rule would mirror current takings law in that the government 
would have substantial discretion to convert private property as necessary to serve the pub-
lic interest so long as it was willing to compensate the owners for their loss. See First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987) (hold-
ing that the Fifth Amendment “does not prohibit the taking of private property, but in-
stead places a condition on the exercise of that power”). 
15 In some cases, a property owner’s harm may be offset in whole or in part by private 
insurance, if available, or by federally supported programs such as national flood insur-
ance. See, e.g., NFIP, About the National Flood Insurance Program, FloodSmart.gov, http:// 
www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/about/nfip_overview.jsp (last visited Jan. 7, 2013). 
Many standard policies exclude damages caused by governmental action, however, includ-
ing “the destruction, confiscation or seizure of property.” Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Home-
owners 3—Special Form 12 (1999), available at http://www.insuringflorida.org/assets/ 
docs/pdf/HO3_sample.pdf; see Home Insurance Exclusions: What Your Policy Won’t Cover, 
Insured.com, http://www.insure.com/home-insurance/exclusions.html (last visited Jan. 
7, 2013). Also, some poorer residents of at-risk communities live on fixed incomes and 
cannot afford insurance premiums even at subsidized rates. Nevertheless, the question of 
moral hazard arises if a landowner could have insured the property against the type of 
harm incurred and chose not to do so. One possible solution would be for mortgage lend-
ers to make flood insurance a condition of the loan; a detailed discussion of insurance 
coverage issues, however, lies beyond the scope of this Article. 
16 This is a matter of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Unlike Pareto efficiency, which only sanc-
tions a shift in resources when the change benefits some party and harms no other party, 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency includes changes that benefit some at the expense of others, so 
long as the injured parties could be fully compensated from the winners’ surplus while still 
leaving the winners better off. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 13 
(7th ed. 2007). 
17 See infra notes 21–53 and accompanying text. 
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ing disaster.18 Part III argues that, regardless of justification, deliberately 
harming innocent people is wrongful and creates a moral obligation to 
compensate the victims.19 Part IV responds to the objection that public 
officials need broad police power to protect the public from disaster 
harm.20 In fact, the availability of compensation would affirm the rule of 
law without diminishing the government’s power to address crises in a 
timely and effective manner. Furthermore, the disparate consequences 
of recent flooding underscore the need to situate disaster law and policy 
within a broader, sustained effort to achieve social justice. 
I. A Necessary Evil 
 Natural disasters cause sudden, widespread, and catastrophic dam-
age.21 In some cases, public officials in charge of disaster response may 
face a choice of evils, in which intervening to protect the public re-
quires the destruction of private property.22 This scenario is particularly 
likely to arise in cases of flood, fire, and epidemic. For instance, fed by 
record rainfall in 2011, the Mississippi River threatened to breach the 
levee system built to contain it and forced a “bitter but necessary trade-
off.”23 In order to protect more populated areas, the Army Corps acted 
pursuant to its statutory authority over the nation’s navigable water-
ways24 and opened floodgates to divert water toward rural communities 
and farmland.25 
                                                                                                                      
 
18 See infra notes 54–141 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 142–232 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 233–286 and accompanying text. 
21 See What Is a Disaster?, Int’l Fed’n Red Cross and Red Crescent Soc’ys, http://www. 
ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/what-is-a-disaster (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2013) (describing disaster as “a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the 
functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or envi-
ronmental losses that exceed the community’s or society’s ability to cope using its own re-
sources”). 
22 See Jim Chen, Modern Disaster Theory: Evaluating Disaster Law as a Portfolio of Legal 
Rules, 25 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1121, 1140 (2011) (describing disaster law as risk manage-
ment decision making); Cohan, supra note 2, at 725–28; see also Daniel A. Farber & Jim 
Chen, Disasters and the Law: Katrina and Beyond, at xix (2006) (asserting that disas-
ter law “is about assembling the best portfolio of legal rules to deal with catastrophic 
risks—a portfolio that includes prevention, emergency response, compensation and insur-
ance, and rebuilding strategies”). 
23 See Campbell Robertson, Areas Will Be Flooded to Protect Louisiana Cities, N.Y. Times, 
May 14, 2011, at A13; see also John M. Barry, Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood 
of 1927 and How It Changed America 78–92 (1997) (providing an overview of flood 
control efforts along the Mississippi River). 
24 See Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U.S.C. §§ 701a–701b (2006) (assigning the Army 
Corps primary flood control responsibility for the nation’s navigable waterways). Further 
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 Under existing law, the federal government has no obligation to 
compensate the affected landowners for their loss.26 Section A of this 
Part explains that the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the 
common law doctrine of public necessity as an exception to the princi-
ple of just compensation embedded in constitutional takings law.27 
Nonetheless, the common law approach to necessity applies only in the 
absence of specific legislation, and Section B reviews state statutes that 
provide redress for damage to private property caused by public disas-
ter response.28 
A. The Public Necessity Exception 
 The underlying purpose of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause 
is “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the pub-
lic as a whole.”29 According to the common law doctrine of public ne-
                                                                                                                      
legislation has reaffirmed the Army Corps’s flood control mission while adding additional 
responsibilities, including irrigation, navigation, recreation, and other water resource pro-
jects. See Water Resources Development Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-114, 121 Stat. 1041 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16, 33, and 42 U.S.C.); Federal Water Project 
Recreation Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. §§ 460l-12–460l-21 (2006); Water Supply Act of 1958, 43 
U.S.C. § 390b (2006). Other federal legislation also affects the use and management of 
navigable waters. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 and 16 U.S.C.); Federal Water Pollution 
Control Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 33 U.S.C.); Fish and Wildlife Coordination 
Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-624, 72 Stat. 563 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
16 U.S.C.); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006). 
25 See Robertson, supra note 23. Local officials acquiesced, given that “the choice [was] 
between bad flooding in one part of Louisiana, or potentially catastrophic flooding in 
another.” See Campbell Robertson, Louisiana’s Dilemma: Bad Flooding, or Worse, N.Y. Times, 
May 13, 2011, at A14. The flooding impacted approximately 2500 people and “thousands 
of acres of farmland.” Id. 
26 The Flood Control Act of 1928 specifically states: “No liability of any kind shall at-
tach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at 
any place.” 33 U.S.C. § 702c. The Act further provides that “the United States shall provide 
flowage rights for additional destructive flood waters that will pass by reason of diversions 
from the main channel of the Mississippi River.” Id. § 702d. The flowage easements to be 
obtained in advance of any flooding, however, are not equal to the fair value of the prop-
erty. Id. Moreover, the Act states that “in all cases where the execution of the flood control 
plan herein adopted results in benefits to property such benefits shall be taken into con-
sideration by way of reducing the amount of compensation to be paid.” Id. In other words, 
even though the Army Corps might someday open the spillway and flood private land, the 
advance price for permission to do so is reduced to reflect the interim benefit to the prop-
erty from its proximity to a national levee system. 
27 See infra notes 29–45 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 46–53 and accompanying text. 
29 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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cessity, however, “one has a complete privilege to destroy, damage, or 
use real or personal property if the actor reasonably believes it to be 
necessary to avert an imminent public disaster.”30 Broadly defined, pub-
lic necessity includes war and “emergencies such as fire, pestilence, po-
lice activities in apprehending criminal suspects, and other exigencies 
in which government officials or private individuals take action to avert 
a public danger.”31 
 In cases of public necessity, “the majority view is that there is no 
duty to pay compensation.”32 Thus, in the 1879 decision, Bowditch v. 
Boston, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “[f]or the Commonwealth a 
man shall suffer damage, as for saving a city or town a house shall be 
plucked down if the next one be on fire; and a thing for the Common-
wealth every man may do without being liable to an action.”33 For rea-
sons not clearly explained, and apparently contrary to the spirit of the 
Takings Clause, those unfortunate enough to lose their property to a 
disaster response must bear the loss alone.34 
 Recent cases in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims have reaffirmed 
this principle.35 For instance, in the 2012 case, TrinCo Investment Co. v. 
United States, “the Forest Service lit a number of fires on or adjacent to 
plaintiffs’ properties” in order to manage wildfires.36 The plaintiffs al-
leged that the Forest Service’s fires caused the damage and that the 
                                                                                                                      
30 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 196 (1965); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 24 (5th ed. 1984). A “public disaster” includes events 
“such as a conflagration, flood, earthquake, or pestilence.” See Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 196 cmt. a (1965). 
31 Cohan, supra note 2, at 691; see also United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952) 
(noting that “the common law had long recognized that in times of imminent peril—such 
as when fire threatened a whole community—the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy 
the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many more could be 
saved”). 
32 Cohan, supra note 2, at 691; see also Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386, 405 (1895) (noting 
that the right of public officers or private individuals to destroy houses to prevent fire from 
spreading rests on public necessity, and, absent a statute explicitly requiring otherwise, 
does not bind actors to compensate, or even contribute to, the loss). 
33 101 U.S. at 18 (citation omitted). In Bowditch, the common law had been modified 
by a state statute that specifically authorized recovery, but its procedural requirements had 
not been met and the plaintiff was denied recovery pursuant to the background common 
law principles. See id. at 20–21. 
34 See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. According to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the ex-
ception to takings law for public necessity appears to “stand as much upon tradition as 
upon principle.” Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922). 
35 See TrinCo Inv. Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 101; Big Oak Farms, 105 Fed. Cl. at 59. The Court 
of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to hear takings claims under the Tucker Act. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
36 106 Fed. Cl. at 98–99. 
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wildfires would not have damaged the plaintiffs’ property.37 Assuming 
the truth of the facts alleged, the court accepted the government’s 
principal argument that disaster response falls outside the Takings 
Clause.38 Accordingly, allegations that the government intentionally set 
fires that damaged the plaintiffs’ property failed to state a claim.39 
 Similarly, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim in another 2012 case, 
Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, which involved allegations that the 
U.S. government took plaintiffs’ “property without just compensation in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment . . . by breaching the levee that pro-
tected plaintiffs’ property with explosives, unleashing a flood . . . .”40 
The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the claim, despite specific allega-
tions concerning the destruction of homes, crops, and farmland,41 in 
part because “[w]here, as here, plaintiffs’ claim is based on a single 
flood that has since receded, plaintiffs have not stated a takings claim.”42 
 Although the Takings Clause does not explicitly overrule the 
common law defense of public necessity, the defense conflicts at a basic 
level with a principle that requires the government to pay just compen-
sation when it conscripts private property to a public purpose.43 In-
deed, the just compensation principle seems squarely at issue when the 
state seeks to advance public purposes that benefit the community in 
aggregate by imposing ruinously high costs on a subset of vulnerable, 
private individuals. The legitimacy of the public purpose is not at issue; 
rather, the question is why private landowners should be barred from 
seeking compensation for their losses. Takings jurisprudence, however, 
has never been a model of clarity,44 and the public necessity exception 
may be simply another case in point.45 
                                                                                                                      
 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 101–02. 
39 Id. 
40 105 Fed. Cl. at 49. 
41 See Second Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 13, at 11–12. 
42 Big Oak Farms, 105 Fed. Cl. at 56. The harm, in other words, was neither permanent 
nor regularly recurring. See Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
43 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 521 (1883); Miss. & Rum River Boom 
Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878); Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 
(13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871) (holding that a dam that had caused economic damage was a 
taking because the land in question was “actually invaded by superinduced additions of 
water, earth, sand, or other material”). 
44 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1170 (1967) (contending 
that takings law is “liberally salted with paradox”); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Tak-
ings Law, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1393, 1524 (1991) (describing the doctrinal “chaos” of takings 
jurisprudence); Andrea L. Peterson, The Taking Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part 
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B. Statutory Redress 
 Whether or not the Supreme Court revisits the public necessity 
exception to the Takings Clause, public responsibility for damage to 
private landowners need not track the outer boundaries of what the 
Constitution permits.46 Rather than rely upon the common law defense 
of public necessity, most states have enacted laws to clarify the govern-
ment’s powers in the context of disaster response and to provide some 
measure of compensation if the government seizes or destroys private 
property.47 Only a handful of states have either passed laws that do not 
                                                                                                                      
I—A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 1299, 1303–04 (1989) (stat-
ing that takings law is “in far worse shape than has generally been recognized”); Carol M. 
Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561, 561 
(1984) (finding the law of takings a “muddle”); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 
74 Yale L.J. 36, 37 (1964) (cataloguing “a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible 
results”). 
45 For an argument that the Takings Clause should include necessity, see Derek T. Muller, 
Note, “As Much Upon Tradition as Upon Principle”: A Critique of the Privilege of Necessity Destruction 
Under the Fifth Amendment, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 481, 482–84 (2006). The author’s analysis 
is consistent with the approach advocated in this Article, but narrower as it is limited to ques-
tions of constitutional interpretation and does not address the substantive content of the 
public necessity exception or broader questions of moral justification. See id. 
46 Indeed, in particular cases (including the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001), 
the government has established a fund for victims, but these payments are purely discre-
tionary. See Julie Goldscheid, Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-9/11 World, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 
167, 196–99 (2004). 
47 See Ala. Code § 31-9-8 (2011); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 26.23.160 (West 2010); Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 26-303 (2000 & Supp. 2011); Ark. Code Ann. § 12-75-124 (2003 & Supp. 
2011); Cal. Gov’t Code § 8572 (West 2012); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-33.5-711.5 (2012); 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 28-11 (West 2009); Del. Code Ann. tit. 20, § 3145 (2005); Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 252.43 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012); Idaho Code Ann. § 46-1012 (2003); 20 
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 3305/7 (West 2008); Ind. Code Ann. § 10-14-3-31 (LexisNexis 
2003); Iowa Code Ann. § 29C.6 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 48-933 
(2005); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39A.110 (LexisNexis 1998); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:730 
(2007); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 37-B, § 821 (2001); Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 14-107 
(LexisNexis 2006); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 30.406 (West 2004); Minn. Stat. § 12.34 
(2010); Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-11 (2010); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 44.100 (West Supp. 2011); 
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 81-829.57 (LexisNexis 2011); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 414.070 (2011); 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:46 (2012); N.J. Stat. Ann. § A:9-51 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 166A-11 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 37-17.1-12 (2004 & Supp. 2011); 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 401.192 (2011); 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7301 (West 1988); R.I. Gen. 
Laws Ann. §§ 30-15-9, 30-15-11 (West 1994 & Supp. 2011); Tenn. Code Ann. § 58-2-115 
(2002); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 418.152 (West 2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 11 (2011); 
W. Va. Code Ann. § 15-5-6 (LexisNexis 2009). 
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include a provision for compensation48 or appear not to have any ap-
plicable statutory provisions.49 
 Among the majority of states that provide for compensation, the 
government conduct subject to compensation varies considerably. For 
instance, a number of states, using substantially identical language, 
provide as a general matter that “[c]ompensation for property shall be 
owed . . . if the property was commandeered or otherwise used in cop-
ing with an emergency and its use or destruction was ordered by the 
Governor or a member of the emergency forces of this state.”50 Yet, 
those states’ statutes exclude the most common circumstances in which 
private property might be seized: 
Nothing in this section applies to or authorizes compensation 
for the destruction or damaging of standing timber or other 
property in order to provide a firebreak or damage resulting 
from the release of waters or the breach of impoundments in 
order to reduce pressure or other danger from actual or 
threatened flood or applies to or authorizes compensation 
beyond the extent of funds available for such compensation.51 
 By contrast, other states provide for just compensation, regardless 
of the specific emergency. Connecticut, for example, authorizes the 
governor to commandeer private property as necessary for disaster re-
sponse, but provides in all cases that “[t]he owner of any property 
taken under this section shall receive just compensation.”52 Likewise, 
Mississippi’s governor may “commandeer or utilize any private property 
if necessary to cope with a disaster or emergency, provided that such 
private property . . . shall be paid for under terms and conditions 
agreed upon by the participating parties.”53 
                                                                                                                      
48 See D.C. Code § 7-2206 (LexisNexis 2001); Ga. Code Ann. § 38-3-51 (2012); Haw. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 128-10.3 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2011); N.Y. Exec. Law § 29 (McKin-
ney 2010 & Supp. 2012); Va. Code Ann. § 44-146.23 (2002 & Supp. 2012). 
49 Research did not uncover statutes on point for Massachusetts, New Mexico, Ohio, 
South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin, or Wyoming. See supra notes 47–48 and accompa-
nying text. 
50 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 252.43(3); accord Ark. Code Ann. § 12-75-124(c) (discussing 
compensation in very similar language); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:730(E) (using substan-
tially identical language about compensation). 
51 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 252.43(6); accord Ark. Code Ann. § 12-75-124(f) (providing ex-
ceptions to compensation in very similar language); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:730(H) (us-
ing substantially identical language about exceptions to compensation). 
52 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 28-11(d). 
53 Miss. Code. Ann. § 33-15-11(c)(3) (2010). 
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 As the varying state approaches make clear, there is nothing ine-
luctable about public necessity doctrine. Congress has the power to leg-
islate in this area and could supplement existing disaster laws aimed at 
relief and recovery with a provision to compensate private individuals 
whose land has been damaged or destroyed in order to protect the 
public good. Such legislation would supplant the common law and 
lessen the burden on courts by providing an administrative framework 
for processing such claims. 
II. Consequentialist Justifications 
 This Part explores consequentialist justifications of the common 
law public necessity defense and offers a preliminary critique. In par-
ticular, if an assessment and potential justification of disaster response is 
to turn on consequences, then the scope of the inquiry should capture 
all choices causally related to those consequences, including decisions 
that can precipitate or defuse disasters. A narrow focus on what necessity 
requires in the context of a specific emergency response fails to account 
for the broader role of the state and its concomitant responsibilities. 
Unlike private actors, lawmakers and responsible officials must plan in 
advance for disaster—not only to set priorities for tradeoffs among 
harms, but also to mitigate vulnerability. Section A of this Part argues 
that the defense of public necessity, as it is usually conceptualized, bears 
a strong resemblance to the trolley problem studied in moral philoso-
phy.54 In particular, necessity arises under time-constrained circum-
stances with restricted options and represents the best outcome among 
imperfect options. Section B contends, however, that such trolley prob-
lems are artificial by design and that a public necessity justification for 
disaster tradeoffs should, at a minimum, encompass a broader under-
standing of the causal factors underlying disaster.55 
A. The Trolley Car Tradeoff 
 In their basic structure, disaster tradeoffs that require an actor to 
cause harm in order to avoid greater harms resemble the well-known 
trolley problem. In this problem, a trolley’s brakes have failed, and the 
driver can either stay on course, in which case several people will die, or 
else switch tracks and cause only one death. Here is the classic account 
of the driver’s dilemma: 
                                                                                                                      
54 See infra notes 56–63 and accompanying text. 
55 See infra notes 64–141 and accompanying text. 
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Suppose you are the driver of a trolley. The trolley rounds a 
bend, and there come into view ahead five track workmen, 
who have been repairing the track. The track goes through a 
bit of a valley at that point, and the sides are steep, so you 
must stop the trolley if you are to avoid running the five men 
down. You step on the brakes, but alas they don’t work. Now 
you suddenly see a spur of track leading off to the right. You 
can turn the trolley onto it, and thus save the five men on the 
straight track ahead. Unfortunately . . . there is one track 
workman on that spur of track. He can no more get off the 
track in time than the five can, so you will kill him if you turn 
the trolley onto him. Is it morally permissible for you to turn 
the trolley?56 
 Whether the hazard involves a flood, a fire, or a trolley car, the 
moral dilemma is substantially the same: remain passive, or intervene, 
thereby sacrificing bystanders in order to reduce the overall losses. Just 
as the trolley driver’s choice determines who lives and who dies, disas-
ter harms may depend upon the priorities of public officials. Thus, the 
trolley problem can inform the moral choices that arise during a disas-
ter when public officials must decide whether to cause (or fail to pre-
vent) harm, be it the loss of life, liberty, or property, in order to avoid 
greater harms.57 
 Most people who evaluate the basic trolley scenario conclude that 
the driver may turn the car in order to save five helpless track workers, 
                                                                                                                      
56 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 Yale L.J. 1395, 1395 (1985) (citing 
Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in Virtues and 
Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy 19 (1978)). It is not clear why trolley cars 
are taken to be emblematic of this kind of reasoning, but they do seem to spur the imagi-
nation. See, e.g., Mikhail Bulgakov, The Master and Margarita 214 (Mirra Ginsburg 
trans., Grove Press 1995) (1967) (“‘Outright! I saw it. Would you believe it—one, and his 
head was off! The right leg—crunch, and in half! The left—crunch, and in half! That’s 
where those streetcars get you!’”). 
57 In addition to tradeoffs between persons, tradeoffs can also occur between values—
for instance, the extent to which we are willing to compromise our collective liberty to 
secure our collective safety. Benjamin Franklin famously declared, “Those who would give 
up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” 
Benjamin Franklin, An Historical Review of Pennsylvania, from Its Origin 289 
(Philadelphia, E. Olmstead & W. Power 1812). Notably, Franklin did not discount safety’s 
value but only asserted that sacrificing an “essential” value for a “temporary” benefit is 
unwise. See id. We would have to venture beyond the rhetoric of his maxim to assess 
whether a particular infringement impairs an “essential” liberty interest or whether the 
benefit will likely endure so as to warrant that infringement. 
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even though changing tracks will cost the other worker his life.58 De-
spite the moral principle that it is wrong to cause harm to another per-
son, let alone deliberately kill that person,59 utilitarian considerations 
prevail.60 Applying the same calculus, it seems that public officials acted 
properly in responding to recent flood conditions on the Mississippi 
River by breaching levees to divert water into rural areas in order to 
save densely populated cities.61 
 The justificatory framework is consequentialist, rather than deon-
tological, because it focuses on the sum of the benefits to be achieved 
by an action and does not set any absolute limits based on fundamental 
notions of right and wrong. For instance, as one commentator has ob-
served, “If rescue workers must choose between groups of thirty and 
five equally blameless people trapped in mine shafts, or caught in a 
burning apartment building, or floundering in the sea, most people 
think they ought to save the larger group straightaway.”62 If the ques-
tion posed is whether to save more people or fewer people, the answer 
seems obvious.63 
                                                                                                                      
58 See, e.g., Thomson, supra note 56, at 1395–96; Tim Stelzig, Comment, Deontology, Gov-
ernmental Action, and the Distributive Exemption: How the Trolley Problem Shapes the Relationship 
Between Rights and Policy, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 901, 932–33 (1998). Opinions vary as to 
whether this decision is mandatory or merely morally acceptable. See id. 
59 See Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral Con-
straints with Economic Analysis of Law, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 325, 325–26 (2008) (citing John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice 26 (rev. ed. 1999) (1971)) (“Deontological moral theories 
hold that whereas the goodness of outcomes counts, it is not the only morally relevant 
factor. . . . Certain acts are inherently wrong and are therefore impermissible even as a 
means to furthering the overall good.”). 
60 See Alan Brudner, A Theory of Necessity, 7 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 339, 341 (1987) 
(noting that the “theory of necessity as justification has traditionally been formulated in 
utilitarian terms”); see also Joe Mintoff, Can Utilitarianism Justify Legal Rights with Moral 
Force?, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 887, 909 (2003) (“[U]tilitarianism claims that the final moral end 
is the promotion of human welfare.”). Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialist reason-
ing. See Zamir & Medina, supra note 59, at 329 (defining “consequentialism” as “a norma-
tive theory that ultimately determines the morality of an act or a rule (or anything else) 
only through its consequences, and which rests on a theory of the good that takes into 
account the well-being of every person”). 
61 See Eric Rakowski, Taking and Saving Lives, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1063, 1063–67 (1993) 
(discussing the utilitarian approach and applying it to hypotheticals). One potential weak-
ness in the analogy is that the trolley hypothetical stipulates the relevant facts, whereas the 
outcome of different decisions in the context of disaster may be uncertain. Cf. David 
Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1425, 1426–28 (2005) (con-
testing the use of “ticking bomb” hypotheticals to justify torture). 
62 Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1063. 
63 But see infra notes 142–232 and accompanying text (posing scenarios that challenge 
this moral intuition). 
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 At this point, though, it may be useful to distinguish the decision 
set available to an actor in the midst of an emergency and the full pano-
ply of planning, mitigation, and response decisions that a state actor will 
make (or fail to make) over time. To the extent that public necessity is 
measured at the time of emergency, the trolley problem provides a help-
ful account of the salient issues that must be evaluated. As the next Sec-
tion illustrates, however, a complete necessity defense requires an actor 
to have been without fault. Accordingly, application of the public neces-
sity defense should include consideration of the state’s broader respon-
sibility for conditions that may have contributed to the crisis. 
B. A Broader Perspective 
 The radical simplicity of the trolley problem, if taken as represen-
tative of moral decision making, threatens to obscure the doctrinal dif-
ficulties inherent in applying the concept of necessity to public choices. 
Specifically, the decisionmaker in a trolley problem cannot address the 
factors that led to the emergency or devise alternate solutions; the pur-
pose of the thought experiment is to pose terrible alternatives under 
compressed time circumstances.64 All other considerations are stipu-
lated away.65 
 Public disaster decision making illustrates the difference. Govern-
ment deliberations can be perceived in terms of the immediacy of a trol-
ley problem if courts, in considering claims of public necessity, evaluate 
only the decisions made during a disaster emergency.66 Yet, notwith-
standing this myopic view of disaster tradeoffs, public officials can act to 
mitigate disaster vulnerability through careful planning, thereby reduc-
ing the likelihood that tradeoffs will become necessary.67 Or, as with the 
flawed plan to suppress all forest fires, government error can exacerbate 
                                                                                                                      
64 See Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? 24 (2009). 
65 See id. 
66 See, e.g., TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 98, 101 (2012) (dismissing a 
takings claim for damage caused by a fire set by the U.S. Forest Service to manage a wild-
fire, despite the plaintiffs’ argument that wildfires had become much more severe as a 
result of prior, misguided Forest Service fire suppression efforts); Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. 
United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 48, 57–58 (2012) (dismissing a takings claim premised on the 
government’s release of floodwaters). 
67 For instance, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) promulgated the 
National Disaster Recovery Framework in an effort to coordinate disaster recovery plans at 
the federal, state, and local levels. See generally FEMA, National Disaster Recovery Frame-
work (2011), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryframework/ndrf.pdf (describ-
ing the concepts and principles that promote effective recovery assistance). 
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natural hazards and make it necessary for government to intervene in 
ways that cause harm.68 
 The state’s comprehensive responsibility for disaster response ex-
tends beyond the immediate crisis encapsulated by the trolley car di-
lemma. Accordingly, an evaluation of the defense of public necessity 
should include the state’s responsibility, if any, for the factors that led to 
the crisis and the adequacy of its plans concerning tradeoffs that might 
become necessary. Two examples of disaster tradeoffs involving Missis-
sippi River flooding will suffice to illustrate the importance of a broader 
perspective. 
1. Drowning St. Bernard and Plaquemines 
 The first modern flood control laws were enacted only after the 
Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 made it painfully clear that the existing 
patchwork of state oversight was grossly inadequate for the task.69 As a 
matter of constitutional law, it had by no means been evident that the 
federal government should have a substantial role. In 1824, in Gibbons 
v. Ogden, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause gives 
the federal government authority to maintain navigable waters and to 
prohibit restrictions on transportation among the states.70 The exten-
sion of that authority to matters such as flood prevention, however, was 
not clarified, and the overall extent of federal power under the Consti-
tution was interpreted narrowly. Perhaps as a consequence, flood con-
trol efforts focused on levee construction on the theory that levees 
would increase the river’s flow, deepening the channels and improving 
navigability, an idea adopted despite the fact that it had been rejected 
decisively by engineering experts.71 
                                                                                                                      
 
68 For example, in the 2012 case, TrinCo Investment Co. v. United States, the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims noted that “one of the [alleged] objectives of this management was ‘the 
reduction of fuel buildup on national forest lands which had accumulated under the For-
est Service’s historical fire abatement policy.’” 106 Fed. Cl. at 99 (citing the plaintiffs’ 
complaint). 
69 See James M. Wright, Ass’n of State Floodplain Managers, The Nation’s Re-
sponses to Flood Disasters: A Historical Account 9 (2000), available at http://www. 
floods.org/PDF/hist_fpm.pdf. A flood happens when “water runoff from the land exceeds 
the capacity of the stream channel.” Id. at 3 (noting that floodwaters bring many benefits 
as they replenish earth and refresh underground springs). Like other natural disasters, 
floods are problematic “only when humans occupy space that streams require for their 
own natural flood patterns.” See id. 
70 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1824) (“The United States possess[es] the general power 
over navigation, and, of course, ought to control, in general, the use of navigable waters.”). 
71 See Joseph L. Arnold, The Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act 5 (1988) 
(“[L]egislation relating to navigation improvements . . . was promptly passed, while flood 
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 In the spring of 1927, unusual amounts of rainwater saturated the 
soil and fed the Mississippi River, causing severe flooding that displaced 
hundreds of thousands of people.72 At its peak, the flood affected seven 
states and engulfed 26,000 square miles.73 The flooding was exacer-
bated by the Army Corps’s exclusive reliance on levees, which ignored 
scientific evidence that blocking the river would only escalate its flow 
and raise its level.74 In New Orleans, residents watched the rising water 
warily and read about flooding upriver with growing concern.75 An in-
dependent hydraulics engineer monitoring the situation issued a re-
port to a prominent newspaper publisher identifying serious weak-
nesses in the city’s defenses, yet also noted that, “paradoxically, a great 
flood would not threaten the city because it was certain to overwhelm 
levees upriver.”76 In that case, the waters would “spread over the land, 
lower the flood height at New Orleans, and eliminate any danger for 
the city.”77 The principal threat was a flood high enough to breach New 
Orleans’ defenses but not so powerful as to breach levees further up-
stream.78 In the ensuing weeks, the flooding worsened, and it became 
increasingly likely that the upstream levees would indeed wash away.79 
                                                                                                                      
 
control legislation received indirect and limited attention.”). Constitutional concerns 
aside, Congress was reluctant to assume financial responsibility for national flood control. 
See id. at 3–4. Also, a “levees only” policy reflected the vision of Andrew Humphreys, who 
became chief of the Army Corps in 1866. Id. at 7. Humphreys “labored constantly to quash 
opposition to the ‘levees only’ policy, and it became the gospel for the Corps of Engineers 
for over 60 years, until the 1927 Mississippi River flood decisively showed its limitations.” 
Id.; see Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century 
of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. Rev. 1471, 1476–78 (2007) (providing a detailed history 
of federal flood control efforts and their failings). 
72 Arnold, supra note 71, at 18 (reporting that “[m]ore than 700,000 people were 
driven from their homes”); see also A.J. Henry, The Floods of 1927 in the Mississippi Basin, 67 
Sci., Jan. 6, 1928, at 15, 15 (describing the various floods occurring late in 1926 and early 
in 1927 that contributed to soil saturation and rising water levels). 
73 Arnold, supra note 71, at 18. 
74 See Patrick O’Hara, Delta Justice: The Trappers War and the Caernarvon Crevasse, Litig., 
Fall 2008, at 57, 58 (noting that “levees prevented flooding into natural spillways” and 
caused the increasingly channelized river to bear down harder on the levees). 
75 See id. at 59 (“Extensive news coverage caused consternation in New Orleans, even as 
local newspapers played down the threat.”). 
76 Barry, supra note 23, at 224; see also O’Hara, supra note 74, at 59–60 (noting that 
“[t]here was no consensus among experts that breaking the levee was necessary,” and re-
porting that the chief of the regional office of the U.S. Weather Bureau thought it was 
unlikely that New Orleans would flood, as failing levees in other areas reduced the threat 
to the city). 
77 Barry supra note 23, at 224. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. at 228–33; see also Kevin R. Kosar, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33126, Disas-
ter Response and Appointment of a Recovery Czar: The Executive Branch’s Re-
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 As river waters continued to rise, public life in New Orleans 
ground to a halt; most people who had the means to evacuate availed 
themselves of the opportunity, notwithstanding the fact that the New 
Orleans papers censored the news in an effort to maintain calm and 
hide the worst.80 On April 15, a rainstorm caused extensive flooding in 
the city, exacerbating an already tense situation, and a group of the 
city’s elite bankers met to discuss possible next steps.81 None had any 
formal authority, but “[b]ankers had a history of taking charge in city 
crises.”82 Further, the bankers’ own business interests were threatened 
by the uncertainty.83 Public spirit and self-interest were deeply inter-
twined. 
 The central question discussed at the meeting, held at a local 
bank, was whether to dynamite the levees so as to divert the Mississippi 
River away from New Orleans and into neighboring St. Bernard and 
Plaquemines Parishes.84 Although the group was aware that the levees 
above New Orleans were unlikely to hold given the intensity of the 
flood, the levee engineer also advised them that some of the escaping 
water could rejoin the river and continue to threaten the city.85 Of 
course, another powerful consideration for the assembled bankers was 
the ongoing threat to the financial health of the city because the flood 
could destroy the economic life of New Orleans, even if the city stayed 
dry.86 
 Business in the city had all but shut down, and many feared that 
bank runs were possible. Further, the city faced competition from new 
ports in Gulfport, Mississippi and Mobile, Alabama, and a loss of confi-
dence had the potential to aid those ports at New Orleans’s expense.87 
One banker reported panic among New Orleans residents and argued 
                                                                                                                      
sponse to the Flood of 1927, at 3 (2005) (reporting that in April 1927, the Mississippi 
River breached multiple levees in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Missouri). 
80 Barry, supra note 23, at 226 (noting that New Orleans was in an agitated state, since 
“[n]o headline, or lack of one, could hide the Mississippi River”). 
81 See Lawrence M. Friedman & Joseph Thompson, Total Disaster and Total Justice: Re-
sponses to Man-Made Tragedy, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 251, 270–71 (2003); O’Hara, supra note 74, 
at 59. 
82 See Barry, supra note 23, at 229. 
83 See id. (noting that “[i]mplicit in the inquiry was the question of investment risk, a 
life-and-death question to” the correspondent banks that had sought assurances). 
84 See Louisiana Levee to Be Cut to Make New Orleans Safe; Wide Area to Be Evacuated, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 27, 1927, at 1; see also Friedman & Thompson, supra note 81, at 270–71 (“[A] 
group of government and business leaders decided to dynamite downstream levees in or-
der to save [New Orleans].”). 
85 See Barry, supra note 23, at 228, 231. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 
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that “[o]nly dynamite will restore confidence.”88 In other words, the 
group was discussing “purposefully loosing the Mississippi River on 
their neighbors . . . . a horrible thing.”89 
 Having concluded that dynamite might well be the answer, the 
bankers sent members of their informal committee to attend an open 
hearing of the Mississippi River Commission (the “Commission”) on 
April 18, and in executive session presented their proposal to blow up 
the levee, directing water away from New Orleans, and to build an 
emergency spillway near Poydras, the place of the river break in 1922.90 
The Commission president posed three conditions for approving the 
request: (1) that the War Department (now known as the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense) approve the plan; (2) that the request come from the 
State of Louisiana; and (3) that “the city would have to absolve the 
commission of any liability for damages and arrange to compensate 
victims of the crevasse fully for any and all losses.”91 Although the plan 
involved the flooding of St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes, repre-
sentatives from the parishes were not invited to the hearing.92 
 As a practical matter, the possible dynamiting of the levee seemed 
to consider only the interests of powerful New Orleans, a fact evident to 
everyone involved, notwithstanding the talk of compensating those in 
adjoining parishes for their losses.93 Indeed the Army Corps had previ-
ously made its position clear: 
After the 1922 Flood the chief of the Army Corps of Engi-
neers had advised the New Orleans financial community that, 
if the river ever seriously threatened the city, they should blow 
                                                                                                                      
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 232 (questioning the group’s motives: “How real was the threat to New Orleans? 
The threat to its business was real enough, but how real was the threat of the river?”). 
90 See id. at 238. The Commission had been established by Congress in 1879 to manage 
federal levee development and flood control efforts. See Mississippi River Commission, U.S. 
Army Corps Engineers, http://www.mvd.usace.army.mil/About/MississippiRiverCommis- 
sion MRC.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2013); The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, U.S. Army 
Corps Engineers, http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pao/bro/misstrib.htm (last updated May 
19, 2004). 
91 Barry, supra note 23, at 238; see also Friedman & Thompson, supra note 81, at 271 
(noting that New Orleans “promised to provide reparations to those in the rural region 
and to create a $150,000 fund to care for the refugees”). 
92 See Barry, supra note 23, at 239; see also O’Hara, supra note 74, at 60 (noting that 
“[n]ot one public official from [the parishes of] Plaquemines or St. Bernard was present 
when the decision to flood these parishes was made, nor was any involved in the negotia-
tions leading up to that decision”). 
93 See O’Hara, supra note 74, at 59 (emphasizing that the governor of Louisiana was 
hesitant to dynamite the levee because doing so in order to save New Orleans “would be 
unpopular in rural areas”). 
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a hole in the levee. In the years since, those words had never 
left the consciousness of either the people in St. Bernard and 
Plaquemines Parishes, who would be sacrificed, or those who 
dealt with the river in New Orleans.94 
 In other words, the availability of the tradeoff constituted an im-
portant part of disaster planning, such as it was. So long as neighboring 
parishes could be flooded, if the need presented itself, New Orleans 
could satisfy itself with existing bulwarks.95 The chief of the Army Corps 
was effectively recommending that necessity, judged at the moment of 
emergency, should guide the decision, and that private individuals 
might even take matters into their own hands.96 
 Yet, the neighboring parishes were far from uninhabited. Detonat-
ing the levee would force 10,000 people to evacuate and would poten-
tially obliterate two of the nearby parishes.97 These parishes, mean-
while, had several notable industries, including fur trapping, sugar 
refinery, stockyards, and casinos.98 Nor were the levees left undefended 
by the citizens of those parishes; St. Bernard’s Parish, for instance, had 
hundreds of armed guards in place around the clock to prevent possi-
ble sabotage of the levee.99 
 On April 22, a New Orleans delegation met in Washington, D.C. 
with the U.S. Secretary of War and the chief of the Army Corps concern-
ing the plan.100 The chief pointed out that destroying the levee did not 
                                                                                                                      
 
94 Barry, supra note 23, at 222. 
95 See id. From its founding, New Orleans has been vulnerable to flooding. See Wright, 
supra note 69, at 4. 
The modern flood problem began when the French Crown built a fortified 
shipping center near the mouth of the Mississippi River. They chose this loca-
tion because the waterway offered a superb avenue of transportation to the 
Gulf of Mexico. By 1727, Nouvelle Orleans, the first permanent European set-
tlement on the Mississippi, existed in a saucer of land that actually was lower 
than the mighty river and was guarded from periodic inundation by an em-
bankment only 4 feet high. 
Id. 
96 See Wright, supra note 69, at 4. 
97 See Barry, supra note 23, at 234. New Orleans’ leaders thought that sacrificing St. 
Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes was for “a greater good,” a better alternative than per-
mitting a levee breach and the flooding of New Orleans itself. See Risk Mgmt. Solutions, 
The 1927 Great Mississippi Flood: 80-Year Retrospective 6 (2007), available at http:// 
www.rms.com/publications/1927_MississippiFlood.pdf. 
98 See Barry, supra note 23, at 234. 
99 See id. at 241. 
100 See Friedman & Thompson, supra note 81, at 271. By this time, the sheer number of 
refugees and the scope of the disaster had made it impossible for the federal government 
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appear to be necessary because levees upriver from New Orleans could 
not hold and the city flood level would remain at manageable levels.101 
One of the New Orleans representatives (a newspaper publisher with 
Washington connections) responded by emphasizing the panic caused 
by the flood’s threat and the Army Corps’s assurances concerning the 
levee option.102 Ultimately, the Secretary of War agreed, subject to a 
formal request from the governor of Louisiana, and provided full in-
demnification of the federal government from any responsibility.103 
 Persuading the governor was not a simple matter. With an election 
impending, “[f]looding country people to save the city did not play 
well politically in rural Louisiana.”104 Politics aside, the governor felt 
that “there was something . . . foul about the idea of the government, 
which should be trying to protect people, destroying people’s liveli-
hoods.”105 As the governor contemplated the decision, he read a pre-
diction made by the local U.S. Weather Bureau chief, Isaac Cline, that 
levees above the city were unlikely to hold and that this would spare 
New Orleans.106 The governor received further reports of levee 
breaches in Arkansas and near Baton Rouge, suggesting New Orleans 
was likely to be spared.107 
 Yet, even if the levee breach was no longer called for as a matter of 
flood management, the New Orleans elite deemed it essential as proof 
of a total commitment to protect New Orleans from danger.108 Faced 
with unrelenting pressure, Cline agreed that he could not be sure how 
the flood would affect the levees and consented to the conveyance of a 
message to the governor that with another rise in the river, “if the levee 
is going to be opened to relieve the situation it should be opened at 
                                                                                                                      
to ignore. See Barry, supra note 23, at 240 (stating that President Calvin Coolidge ap-
pointed U.S. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover chairman of a special committee to 
coordinate rescue and relief efforts). 
101 See Barry, supra note 23, at 240. 
102 See id. at 241. The New Orleans publisher further stated, “what was the cost of blow-
ing the levee? It would flow only marsh.” Id. He also quoted the chief’s predecessor, who 
earlier had proposed blowing a “hole in a levee.” Id. 
103 See id. 
104 Id. at 242; see also O’Hara, supra note 74, at 59 (“Governor Oramel Simpson found 
himself in a difficult position because cutting the levee to save New Orleans would be un-
popular in rural areas.”). 
105 Barry, supra note 23, at 242. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. at 243 (noting that “the failures of those levees also strongly suggested more 
crevasses would follow”). 
108 See O’Hara, supra note 74, at 59–60. Cline did not believe that New Orleans would 
flood, as failing levees upstream would reduce the threat of flooding. See id. The city’s 
leaders, however, exerted extensive pressure on Cline until he “eventually relented.” See id. 
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once.”109 Based on this statement, the governor agreed to order the 
levee’s destruction upon receipt of confirmation from engineers that 
detonating the levee was “absolutely necessary” and “written promises 
from the city of New Orleans to compensate victims for all losses.”110 
 The New Orleans establishment provided the governor what he 
required, and the order to dynamite the levee followed. The citizens of 
New Orleans were satisfied, but those in St. Bernard and Plaquemines 
Parishes were “angry and frightened.”111 The sheriff in St. Bernard 
stated, “We’re letting ’em do it because we can’t stop ’em . . . . You can’t 
fight the Government.”112 In New Orleans, the “fine families, as if on a 
picnic, traveled down to see the great explosion that would send dirt 
hundreds of feet high and create a sudden Niagara Falls.”113 Mean-
while, “[a]s the explosion sounded, [the St. Bernard sheriff] flinched, 
then turned around and said, ‘Gentlemen, you have seen today the 
public execution of this parish.’”114 The next day, levees upstream gave 
way, easing the threat—the destruction of St. Bernard and Plaquemines 
had been totally unnecessary.115 The promised compensation from 
New Orleans was never paid.116 
 The political machinations surrounding the destruction of St. 
Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes exemplify a case in which public 
necessity based upon immediate peril should be no defense to liability. 
First, given the weight of expert opinion that the levees upriver would 
                                                                                                                      
109 Barry supra note 23, at 243–44. 
110 Id. at 244. Governor Oramel Simpson required these safeguards because he only 
“reluctantly agreed to authorize the artificial crevasse.” See O’Hara, supra note 74, at 60. 
111 See Barry, supra note 23, at 255. 
112 Id. at 257. Additionally, leading officials in Plaquemines and St. Bernard “recog-
nized that nothing could be done to stop the levee break,” and proceeded to “persuade[] 
the infuriated citizens that resistance would only add bloodshed to the tragedy.” O’Hara, 
supra note 74, at 60. 
113 Barry, supra note 23, at 256. 
114 Id. at 257. 
115 See id. at 257–58. In fact, it took ten days and 78,000 pounds of dynamite to create 
the artificial crevasse. See O’Hara, supra note 74, at 60. Upstream levees began to fail after 
the first day of dynamiting at Caernarvon. See id. In an interesting parallel, conspiracy 
theorists in the Lower Ninth Ward during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 believed that the 
levees were dynamited “with the intention of saving the wealthier and whiter sections of 
the city.” Risk Mgmt. Solutions, supra note 97, at 6. 
116 See Barry, supra note 23, at 360 (“No bank, business, or government agency ever 
made a voluntary payment to the victims to fulfill the self-proclaimed moral obligation.”). 
The promised compensation was contained in what was known as the “Citizens Resolu-
tion.” See O’Hara, supra note 74, at 60. None of the sixty-four signers committed public or 
private funds, but rather “pledge[d] to do their best . . . to see that victims were reim-
bursed.” Id. A year later, the Louisiana Constitution was amended to provide for repara-
tions to victims of the 1927 decision, but compensation payments were minimal. See id. 
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give way naturally, there is a strong argument that there was no reason-
able belief that the breach was necessary.117 If so, a basic element of the 
necessity defense was missing. Second, even if the levee breach might 
have been a reasonable exercise of discretion in dealing with a disaster 
emergency, a broader perspective would encompass actions taken be-
fore the immediate crisis. 
 It was also negligent, if not reckless, for the Army Corps to tell New 
Orleans to plan to flood its neighbor and to substitute this advice for 
proper planning.118 Although the Army Corps’s advice was given years 
before the 1927 flood, the irresponsibility of the advice should also 
have exposed the United States to liability for the disaster. Moreover, 
the levees-only policy adopted by the Army Corps was contrary to all 
expert advice and designed only to make floods more severe. Indeed, 
previous flooding had already made plain that there was a problem. As 
exemplified by the woeful performance of the Army Corps in the years 
leading up to the 1927 flood, inadequate disaster planning should be 
relevant to a necessity defense, even if the case can be made that a par-
ticular disaster tradeoff was reasonably necessary in the midst of an ac-
tual emergency.119 
2. “Project Flood” 
 The disastrous 1927 flooding provided the needed impetus for the 
development of modern flood control laws.120 The Flood Control Act 
of 1928 for the first time committed the federal government to flood 
management, and created the Mississippi Rivers and Tributaries Project 
                                                                                                                      
117 See Barry, supra note 23, at 257–58; see also O’Hara, supra note 74, at 60 (noting 
that Cline and other experts correctly predicted that natural levee breaches upriver would 
have ensured that New Orleans would escape flooding). In fact, it seems to have been an 
almost foregone conclusion that those with political and economic power would be pro-
tected and that the areas outside New Orleans were expendable; this conclusion was evi-
denced by the fact that the decision was made through the lobbying efforts of New Or-
leans politicians in a process that excluded the voices of those who would be affected and 
who might have advanced other alternatives. See Barry, supra note 23, at 231, 239. 
118 This wrongful act, however, may not have been actionable in 1927. Although the 
Tucker Act of 1887 was available to redress claims for damages arising from the U.S. Con-
stitution, Congress did not enact the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) until 1946. See Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); Tucker Act of 1887, 28 
U.S.C. § 1491(a); Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal Torts Claims Act: A Different Meta-
phor, 44 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 1105, 1106–09 (2009) (describing the FTCA as the 
“exclusive vehicle” for bringing tort lawsuits against the federal government). 
119 See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 71, at 1476–78 (detailing the history and failings of 
federal flood control efforts). 
120 See Wright, supra note 69, at 9. 
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(the “Project”), a board which is administered by the Mississippi River 
Commission (the “Commission”) and is supervised by the Office of 
Chief Engineers of the Army Corps.121 Although the modern regula-
tory structure is a marked improvement over the ad hoc approach fol-
lowed in 1927, a number of fundamental problems remain. 
 The Project’s task is to handle the “project flood” —any flood lar-
ger than the 1927 flood.122 The project flood represents a worst-case 
scenario, developed in detail through a cooperative effort involving the 
Weather Bureau, the Army Corps, and the Commission, and draws 
from data about the “sequence, severity, and distribution of past major 
storms.”123 The most recent version was developed in the mid-1950s.124 
The project flood plan involves several components: (1) levees for con-
tainment, (2) spillways to divert excess flow, (3) channel improvements, 
and (4) dams and reservoirs.125 These basic components remain in 
place today.126 Notably, the Project represents a significant departure 
from the Army Corps’s “levees only” policy, which failed so dramatically 
in 1927,127 because it supplements the use of levees with spillways and 
reservoirs to contain excess water.128 
                                                                                                                      
121 See Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. §§ 702b–702c (2006); see also supra note 90 
(describing the Commission). Not until the Flood Control Act of 1936 did Congress au-
thorize the creation of a truly national approach to flood control. See Arnold, supra note 
71, at 1. 
122 See The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, supra note 90. 
123 Miss. River Comm’n, The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project: Control-
ling the Project Flood 2 (2007), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/climate/docs/ 
MR-T-info.pdf. 
124 See id. 
125 See The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, supra note 90. 
126 See Miss. River Comm’n, supra note 123, at 2. 
127 Under this policy, levees were relied on as “the only mechanism for flood preven-
tion” because the levee system was thought to be a “sufficient flood prevention device by 
‘scouring and enlarging’ the river beds and channel, allowing for more water to flow with-
out escaping the river banks.” Mark C. Niles, Punctuated Equilibrium: A Model for Administra-
tive Evolution, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 353, 393 (2011). A major component in the accep-
tance of the “levees only” policy was likely the fact that no resources were available to fund 
alternative flood prevention mechanisms. See id. at 393–94. 
128 See Miss. River Comm’n, supra note 123, at 2. Flood protection measures provided 
for in the plan divide the Mississippi River into northern, middle, and southern sections. 
Barry, supra note 23, at 423–25. In the northern section, the main “flood control feature 
is a ‘floodway,’ essentially a parallel river 5 miles wide and 65 miles long, running from 
Birds Point, Missouri, south to New Madrid, Missouri.” Id. at 423. The middle section con-
tains a long stretch of levees, and, near the mouth of the Atchafalaya River, the “Old River 
Control Structure and . . . the Morganza floodway, immense masses of concrete and steel 
designed to divert” floodwaters into the Atchafalaya. Id. at 424. Finally, in the southern 
section, there “is a concrete spillway at Bonnet Carre, 30 miles above New Orleans, de-
signed to [send outflow] . . . into Lake Pontchartrain.” Id. at 425. 
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 Unlike in 1927, when it was unclear who had the authority to or-
der the diversion of floodwaters, the operation of the floodways is today 
assigned to the Army Corps and is not left to the discretion of local 
public officials, let alone community leaders in areas potentially af-
fected by flooding.129 Project flood provides detailed guidance; the 
river conditions that would warrant use of the spillways can be antici-
pated and have been planned for in advance.130 Further, each aspect of 
project flood is regulated by operational plans created pursuant to 
statutory authority.131 For instance, the operational plan for the Birds 
Point-New Madrid Floodway includes detailed protocol for ordering a 
levee breach, executing the order, and evacuating residents.132 Conse-
quently, flood-management decisions can be made without the un-
seemly and chaotic spectacle of various potential decisionmakers de-
manding legal opinions absolving themselves of responsibility. 
 The procedural improvements wrought by project flood are plain; 
in addition to streamlining the decision-making process for addressing 
flood conditions, the operational plans effectively codify the elements 
                                                                                                                      
129 See The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, supra note 90. In 1983, for example, ris-
ing floodwaters in the Mississippi Valley caused the Commission to make contingency plans 
for the operation of the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway. See Miss. River Comm’n, The 
Mississippi River and Tributaries Project: Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway 12 
(2011), available at http://www.mvd.usace.army.mil/mrc/mrt/Docs/Birds%20Point-New% 
20Madrid%20info%20paper%20FINAL%200426.pdf. When the federal government insti-
tuted eminent domain proceedings, private plaintiffs who owned land that would be flooded 
filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the Army Corps from breaching the levees and flooding the 
Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway. Story v. Marsh, 574 F. Supp. 505, 508 (E.D. Mo. 1983), 
rev’d, 732 F.2d 1375 (8th Cir. 1984). The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri granted a temporary injunction, declaring that breaching the levee would violate the 
National Environmental Protection Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Fifth Amendment. See 
id. at 517. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the Flood 
Control Act of 1928 committed the decision of whether to breach the levee to the Army 
Corps, a federal agency, and that the Army Corps’s discretionary decision was not subject to 
judicial review. See Story v. Marsh, 732 F.2d 1375, 1379–82 (8th Cir. 1984). Although the gov-
ernment had not obtained flowage easements for the entire floodway, as required by section 
4 of the Flood Control Act of 1928, the proper remedy for obtaining a flowage easement was 
not an injunction, but rather proceedings under the Tucker Act to receive compensation for 
the easement. Id. at 1384–85; see 33 U.S.C. § 702(d) (2006). 
130 See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway Operations 
Plan, at B-1 (1986) (on file with author) (outlining the conditions which would prompt the 
use of the spillway and the timetable pursuant to which the Army Corps would operate, 
should use of the spillway become necessary). 
131 See id. at 1 (noting that the statutory authority for creating the plan derives from 
the Flood Control Act of 1928 and the Flood Control Act of 1965). 
132 See Barry, supra note 23, at 425. 
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of necessity for activating a floodway.133 For instance, the decision to 
open all three floodways in response to flood conditions in 2011 was 
made pursuant to particular factors that had been identified and codi-
fied in accordance with ordinary agency rulemaking procedures.134 
 Nonetheless, for all the helpful guidance they provide, the opera-
tions plans only address the immediate tradeoffs involved in managing 
flood conditions. A broader view of the problem, however, must take 
into account the factors that can make flooding more or less likely. De-
spite the stated goal of managing the worst-case flood, the Army 
Corps’s mission has grown ever more complex, including potentially 
competing goals such as irrigation, recreation, navigation, reservoir 
maintenance, and environmental protection.135 
 Also, just as the Army Corps once advised New Orleans that it 
could drown its neighbors should the need arise, the Army Corps now 
handles that unpleasant task directly, advising floodway residents that, 
in the event of flood conditions, it could become necessary to open the 
spillway.136 Admittedly, the notifications are an improvement in that, 
returning to the trolley problem analogy, those in the path of the trol-
ley have notice that the track will be switched if necessary to avoid 
greater harm, thus allowing them to take appropriate precautions.137 
                                                                                                                      
 
133 See The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, supra note 90. The broader effective-
ness of the flood control plans, however, may be questioned. See Klein & Zellmer, supra 
note 71, at 1473 (arguing that the flood control system in the United States is defective 
and is “incapable of controlling flood waters or preventing loss of life and property”). 
134 See Morganza Floodway, U.S. Army Corps Engineers, http://www.mvn.usace.army. 
mil/bcarre/morganza.asp (last updated Jan. 3, 2012); Paul Rioux, Morganza Floodway Opens to 
Divert Mississippi River Away from Baton Rouge, New Orleans, Times-Picayune (New Orleans) 
(May 14, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2011/05/morganza_ 
floodway_opens_to_div.html. Relevant factors include the following: 
The decision to open the Morganza Floodway relies on current and projected 
river flows and levee conditions, river currents and potential effects on navi-
gation and revetments, extended rain and stage forecasts, and the duration of 
high river stages. When river flows at the Red River Landing are predicted to 
reach 1.5 million [cubic feet per second] and rising, the Corps considers 
opening the Morganza Floodway. 
Morganza Floodway, supra. 
135 See supra note 24 (discussing the Flood Control Act of 1936, which assigned primary 
flood control responsibility for the nation’s navigable waterways to the Army Corps, and 
subsequent legislation that expanded the Army Corps’s responsibilities). 
136 See Morganza Floodway, supra note 134. 
137 Legal challenges to the floodway have been unavailing. In Kirk v. Good, a 1929 case 
from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, a farmer who owned 
property within the floodway area sued to enjoin the construction contracts to build the 
setback levee. 13 F. Supp. 1020, 1021 (E.D. Mo. 1929). Kirk claimed he would be unable to 
sell his property or use it as security for loans because it had the possibility of being 
152 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:127 
Yet, because of the notice (and nominal easement payments in many 
cases), those private individuals must take on the full risk of loss for the 
community. In effect, the government has paid a modest premium to 
shift the collective responsibility of insuring against loss from its own 
shoulders, which are as broad as the federal government’s tax base, and 
onto individuals who lack significant economic resources, and, as a 
practical matter, may not be able to obtain insurance coverage.138 
 The Army Corps operations plan also fails to consider background 
conditions of social inequality that relegate some people to areas subject 
to flooding.139 For instance, as observed in one news report covering the 
2011 floods, “nine of the 11 counties that touch the Mississippi River in 
Mississippi have poverty rates at least double the national average of 13.5 
percent.”140 Although the levees protected urban areas, they provided 
no defense to smaller, poorer communities in the Mississippi River delta 
and in counties abutting the river south of the delta and into Louisi-
                                                                                                                      
flooded in the future. See id.; Brian Lee & Alice M. Noble-Allgire, High Water in the Nation’s 
Breadbasket: A Takings Analysis of the Government’s Response to the Mississippi River’s Great Flood 
of 2011, 26 Prob. & Prop. 28, 32 (2012). The court denied the application for an injunc-
tion, holding that Kirk’s damages were “mere consequential damages such as the prospec-
tive construction of any great public work is likely to entail, and for which relief is not af-
forded.” Kirk, 13 F. Supp. at 1021. Additionally, the court held that an injunction was an 
inappropriate remedy, as the Flood Control Act of 1928 provided for adequate remedies in 
the form of flowage easements. See id.; see also supra note 129 (discussing Story v. Marsh and 
a failed challenge to the Army Corps’s use of the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway). 
138 See Nate Monroe, Future Uncertain for Those Without Flood Uninsurance, Daily 
Comet.com (May 21, 2011, 6:01 AM) http://www.dailycomet.com/article/20110521/ 
ARTICLES/110529947?template (interviewing a homeowner who “has understood the 
urging of local, state and federal officials over the years that home owners like herself in 
flood-prone communities purchase flood insurance”). One homeowner explained that she 
would buy the insurance if she could afford it, but she lives on a fixed income. See id. Oth-
erwise, she reported, “I would be as insuranced out as I am licensed up if I could.” See id. 
139 Similar problems arise from local decision making “when the obstacles to exit are 
insuperable for some yet easily overcome by others.” Ian Shapiro, Democratic Justice 36 
(2001) (citing white flight from inner-city school districts as an example of an exit option 
negatively impacting the effectiveness of localism). In light of “the reality that different 
players are differently bound by collective decisions,” one scholar has suggested that “con-
straints other than choosing one local decision rule over another should come into play.” 
Id. For similar reasons, the Army Corps ensures that important tradeoffs will not be de-
termined by local political power. Nonetheless, because the choices made by the Army 
Corps pursuant to the Flood Control Act do not take into account preexisting inequities, 
this Article endorses official planning that addresses and mitigates disaster vulnerability. 
140 Poor Taking Brunt of Mississippi’s Bulge, MSNBC.com (May 11, 2011, 8:32 PM), http:// 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42985277/ns/weather#.UKMwEIf4Lng (citing figures from the 
U.S. Census Bureau). Exercising his presidential discretion, President Barack Obama signed 
a disaster declaration for fourteen Mississippi counties affected by the flooding, making low-
interest loans available to cover uninsured damage. See id. 
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ana.141 Consequently, the floodwaters overflowing the banks of the river 
and its tributaries left their mark on those least able to bear it. 
 Rather than seek to account for social inequality, the cost-benefit 
calculus called for in the Army Corps operations plan takes existing 
distributions of property, population, and other relevant factors as giv-
ens, as noted above. Once we move past the limiting assumptions of the 
trolley problem framework, however, background conditions of ine-
quality should give us pause, especially when the government’s ap-
proach to disaster tradeoffs does nothing to resolve the substantive un-
fairness of taking from those least able to afford the loss. 
III. The Limits of Consequentialism 
 Moral choices involve the character as well as the consequences of 
our actions. To claim otherwise is to accept that the ends can always 
justify the means.142 Variations of the basic trolley problem help to fo-
cus attention on categorical moral constraints as well as contingent 
cost-benefit analysis. For instance, if we conclude that we would save the 
five helpless workers by switching tracks, we may then be presented with 
a related scenario in which the only way to save the five workers is to 
shove an obese man onto the tracks in front of them.143 Or we may be 
asked to imagine that we are a physician who can save five of her pa-
tients only by sacrificing one healthy patient and harvesting his or-
gans.144 In each case, the raw numbers are the same—one life for five— 
and yet the choices are not morally identical.145 
                                                                                                                      
 
141 See id. 
142 According to some scholars, the ends never justify the means; for instance, deonto-
logical constraints do not bend to utilitarian considerations even when torturing a terrorist 
could reveal the location of a hidden nuclear weapon. See Jeremy Waldron, Torture, 
Terror and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House 1–20, 186–91 (2010); Jer-
emy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 
1681, 1709–17 (2005). Others recognize the existence of moral constraints but contend 
that morality does not preclude the torture of other human beings if the benefits of doing 
so are sufficiently large. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understand-
ing the Threat, Responding to the Challenge 141 (2002) (advocating for the institu-
tion of judicial “torture warrants”). 
143 See, e.g., F.M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality: Volume II: Rights, Duties, and 
Status 143–72 (2001) (discussing the trolley problem and defending the distinction be-
tween killing and redirecting harm); Sandel, supra note 64, at 22–23 (discussing this ver-
sion of the trolley problem). 
144 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Torture, Necessity, and the Union of Law & Philosophy, 36 
Rutgers L.J. 183, 188 (2004). One might resist the force of the hypothetical by positing a 
further deterrent effect on healthy patients going to doctors and a longer-term deterioration 
of the health of society (i.e., that the overall utility calculus might be improved by allowing 
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 Accordingly, this Part contends that even if disaster tradeoffs were 
judged without regard for precipitating factors that may have exacer-
bated social vulnerability, the state’s moral responsibility extends be-
yond the simple maximization of aggregate benefits. Section A revisits 
the trolley problem and argues that disaster tradeoffs involve moral di-
lemmas because all available choices involve the violation of a moral 
maxim.146 Section B contends that public necessity doctrine relies upon 
a thin version of moral consequentialism and fails to engage with the 
full weight of the moral dilemmas that arise during disasters.147 Section 
C argues that a decision to inflict harm on innocent people is always 
tragic and deserving of recompense.148 
A. Moral Dilemmas 
 A moral dilemma involves a situation in which one both “ought to 
do something and ought not to do that thing.”149 Or, to put the point 
slightly differently, a dilemma can arise if “it seems that I ought to do 
each of two things, but I cannot do both.”150 Whether the relevant 
choice involves action versus inaction, or a choice between two differ-
ent actions, moral dilemmas concern “cases in which there is a conflict 
between two moral judgments . . . relevant to deciding what to do.”151 
In these cases, deliberation offers no decisive reason to prefer one or 
the other alternative.152 
                                                                                                                      
 
the four patients to die). But this avoids the point and could be resolved through further 
stated assumptions (i.e., that the healthy patient’s disappearance can be concealed). 
145 To be clear, I do not aim to offer a comprehensive moral theory that could success-
fully join utilitarian and deontological concerns. Rather, I simply take it as a given that 
ordinary moral judgments include the nature of an action as well as its outcome, such that 
killing a healthy patient to harvest his organs is qualitatively different than redirecting the 
path of a runaway trolley car. 
146 See infra notes 149–180 and accompanying text. 
147 See infra notes 181–217 and accompanying text. 
148 See infra notes 218–232 and accompanying text. 
149 See E.J. Lemmon, Moral Dilemmas, in Moral Dilemmas 101, 105 (Christopher W. 
Gowans ed., 1987). One philosopher has contended that, because an individual remains 
free to choose one of the alternatives, there is no formal contradiction. See id. at 107. “It is 
a nasty fact about human life that we sometimes both ought and ought not to do things; 
but it is not a logical contradiction.” See id. 
150 See Bernard Williams, Ethical Consistency, in Moral Dilemmas, supra note 149, at 
115, 121 (“The two situations, then, come to this: in the first, it seems that I ought to do a 
and that I ought to do b, but I cannot do both a and b; in the second, it seems that I ought 
to do c and that I ought not to do c.”). 
151 See id. at 120. 
152 See Philippa Foot, Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma, in Moral Dilemmas, supra note 
149, at 250, 260–61 (“[A]n obligation is not annulled by being overridden, and . . . it is 
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 Moral dilemmas may stem from a common obligation owed to 
more than one person or may reflect differing sources of moral obliga-
tion.153 For instance, we incur “specific obligations . . . either by a de-
liberate undertaking or by some special relation to the person or insti-
tution in question.”154 Simply by making a promise, one incurs some 
obligation to perform according to the promise.155 Such obligations 
will often have legal force. For example, in criminal law, the “creation 
of peril” doctrine and the doctrine of voluntary assumption of care and 
seclusion both impose a duty to act on an individual and provide for 
criminal sanctions for those who fail to act.156 In corporate law, manag-
ers owe fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders.157 
 In addition to particularized contractual or fiduciary obligations, 
there are also “constraints on action deriving from general rights that 
everyone has, either to do certain things or not to be treated in certain 
ways.”158 The derivation and precise content of these rights are, of 
course, debatable.159 On even the most limited view of our obligation 
to others, for instance, the use and exercise of our own rights cannot 
preclude others from enjoyment of similar basic rights.160 
                                                                                                                      
possible to say that a subject ought to do something even when a more pressing claim 
makes it impossible for him to do that thing.”). 
153 See Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in Moral Dilemmas, supra note 149, 
at 174, 175 (contending that “[t]here are five fundamental types of value that give rise to 
basic conflict”). 
154 Id. 
155 See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obliga-
tion 7–17 (1981) (arguing that such moral obligation provides an explanatory structure 
for the law of contract). 
156 See Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 Yale L.J. 1236, 
1274 (2010) (“Once persons have voluntarily assumed responsibility to care for designated 
dependents, any failure to provide appropriate care should subject the registrant to crimi-
nal liability.”); John A. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal 
Analysis, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 213, 229–30 (1975) (describing the “creation of peril” doctrine’s 
applicability to infants delivered alive). 
157 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 
1549, 1593–97 (1989). 
158 Nagel, supra note 153, at 175. 
159 See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities 
and the Communitarian Agenda 4–11 (1993) (noting that “incessant issuance of new 
rights . . . causes a massive inflation of rights that devalues their moral claims”); Mary Ann 
Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 7–17 (1991) 
(discussing the unique nature of the American view on what constitutes the scope of a 
general right, and arguing that the current absolute deference to such rights “promotes 
unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue”). 
160 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 33 (1974) (arguing that there is 
no “justified sacrifice of some of us for others”). 
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 Another category of moral obligation relies on consequentialism: 
“the consideration that takes into account the effects of what one does 
on everyone’s welfare—whether or not the components of that welfare 
are connected to special obligations or general rights.”161 For example, 
if one has made a promise and it now appears that performing the 
promise would damage the community, the effect on public welfare is a 
moral consideration that the promisor would have reason to take into 
account.162 
 When the values on each side of a moral equation are weighty, the 
conflict can appear insoluble. Every choice appears to be foreclosed in 
advance, and yet we must somehow choose. Inaction is, after all, also a 
choice. The most difficult dilemmas of this kind involve the loss of hu-
man life—when our ability to save the greatest number of lives turns on 
our willingness to sacrifice other lives. The conflict pits the obligation 
to account for everyone’s welfare by saving as many people as possible 
against the obligation to refrain from causing injury to another per-
son.163 
 To dramatize this predicament, we might again consider a scenario 
in which “a runaway trolley will kill five workers unless a bystander 
shunts it onto a side track, where it will kill one.”164 Unless the by-
stander acts, more people will be killed; yet, if she acts, she will cause 
the death of an innocent person who otherwise would not have been 
harmed. In order to protect the five workers, most of us conclude that 
“the right course—certainly in most cases an irreproachable course—is 
to divert the train.”165 The analysis is utilitarian, because it justifies the 
action by its overall consequences—preserving the lives of five people, 
rather than only one.166 
 By contrast, it is generally accepted that a surgeon should not carve 
up one healthy patient and harvest his organs in order to save five criti-
                                                                                                                      
161 Nagel, supra note 153, at 175 (identifying this category as “utility”). Professor Tho-
mas Nagel also identifies “perfectionist ends or values” and a “commitment to one’s own 
projects or undertakings” as additional grounds for moral choice. Id. at 176. 
162 See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and 
Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 17, 42–48 (1985). Assuming that 
the potential damage to the community was significant, the choice between the promise 
and the community’s welfare would hardly count as a moral dilemma. 
163 See Nagel, supra note 153, at 175. 
164 Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1063. In other versions of the hypothetical, the deci-
sionmaker is the trolley driver rather than a bystander. For our purposes, nothing turns on 
this distinction. 
165 Id. at 1063–64. 
166 See Zamir & Medina, supra note 59, at 329. 
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cally ill patients.167 Although we may assume that this is the only way to 
help the five, killing an innocent patient is categorically wrong, regard-
less of the number of lives saved.168 It would be better, most people con-
clude, to allow the five patients to die, even though the surgeon had the 
power to save them. Logically, the contrast seems puzzling; although 
utilitarian considerations prevailed in addressing the trolley problem, 
here the best outcome appears to be prohibited by deontological con-
straints.169 The task, then, is either to account for the divergence in our 
strong moral intuitions, despite the fact that the same number of lives is 
at stake, or else to argue that one or both of the moral principles that 
seem to guide our intuitions are mistaken or misconstrued.170 
 The difficulties explored in the trolley problem are relevant to dis-
aster response because natural disasters create real-life situations involv-
ing similar considerations. For example, public officials in recent disas-
ters have had to decide whether to flood farmland and small towns to 
protect cities,171 whether to expose plant workers to potentially fatal 
levels of radiation to stabilize damaged nuclear reactors,172 and 
whether to order looters shot on sight to maintain public order.173 In 
each case, the choice was whether to harm some people in order to 
protect many more.174 
                                                                                                                      
 
167 See Ferzan, supra note 144, at 188 (“[W]hile most people believe it is permissible to 
turn the infamous runaway trolley so that it kills one lone worker instead of five, we reject 
that a surgeon can kill one person and use his organs to save five others.”). 
168 See Sandel, supra note 64, at 23. 
169 See id. at 23 (noting the existence of “conflicting moral principles” in that “one 
principle that comes into play in the trolley story says we should save as many lives as pos-
sible, but another says it is wrong to kill an innocent person, even for a good cause”). 
170 See John Martin Fischer, The Trolley and the Sorites, 4 Yale J.L. & Human. 105, 105–09 
(1992) (rejecting the distinction between the trolley and transplant examples). 
171 See Robertson, supra note 25. 
172 See Martin Fackler, Japan Weighed Evacuating Tokyo in Nuclear Crisis, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
27, 2012, at A1 (describing the conclusion of an investigative report issued by the Rebuild 
Japan Initiative Foundation as follows: “‘Prime Minister Kan had his minuses and he had 
his lapses,’ Mr. Funabashi said, ‘but his decision to storm into Tepco [the company that 
operated the nuclear power plant] and demand that it not give up saved Japan.’”). To 
accomplish the goal, Japanese officials increased the legal levels of radiation exposure so 
that TEPCO workers could be sent in to stabilize damaged nuclear reactors. See id. Of 
course, unlike the victims of a runaway trolley, the workers had the ability to refuse to work 
and may (or may not) have been provided with accurate information about the radiation 
risks involved. 
173 See Troops Told “Shoot to Kill” in New Orleans, ABC News (Sept. 2, 2005, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2005-09-02/troops-told-shoot-to-kill-in-new-orleans/2094678 
(reporting Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco’s statement that the National Guard had 
orders “to shoot and kill ‘hoodlums’”). 
174 Even more difficult choices are not hard to envision. If a fatal, incurable, and 
highly contagious disease were detected in an urban center, for instance, might the gov-
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 Moreover, the trolley problem analogy applies even when officials 
do not cause harm but fail to prevent it, because neglect can be as fatal 
as deliberate injury175—when not everyone can be rescued, triage pri-
oritization will determine who lives and who dies.176 To see the analogy, 
imagine that disaster officials are operating a trolley car that rescues the 
people in its path instead of killing them; when those who are aban-
doned by the trolley will die, the choice of tracks is no less important 
than in the original scenario.177 Thus, as a matter of formal structure, 
the trolley hypothetical applies to decisions that involve causing harm 
and to decisions that involve rescue. 
 Described more formally, the moral dilemma in triage situations is 
whether to rescue Group A or Group B when both cannot be rescued. 
For instance, when evacuating patients during Hurricane Katrina, were 
hospital officials right to leave the sickest patients for last?178 Although 
we might have assumed that officials would prioritize those who were 
most vulnerable, in fact they concentrated their initial efforts on the 
healthiest patients in the hospital: “Those who were in fairly good 
                                                                                                                      
ernment establish a quarantine, condemning even uninfected people within the cordon to 
a certain and painful death? For fictional accounts of this scenario, see Albert Camus, 
The Plague (1947) (outbreak of bubonic plague); 28 Weeks Later (Twentieth Century 
Fox 2007) (spread of deadly “Rage Virus”). 
175 See Susan S. Kuo, Bringing in the State: Toward a Constitutional Duty to Protect from Mob 
Violence, 79 Ind. L.J. 177, 222–26 (2004) (arguing that official failure to act can compound 
riot harm or even spark a riot). 
176 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1081 n.43, 1154–55. If people are lying helpless on 
the track, do we rescue them in the order that we find them, or focus on moving the 
greatest number (perhaps by focusing on the lightest weight), or look for the mayor and 
important officials, or start with women and children? Long-established maritime practice, 
for example, prioritizes women and children during emergency evacuations. See Brian 
Palmer, Abandoning Ship: An Etiquette Guide, Slate ( Jan. 17, 2012, 4:55 PM), http://www. 
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/01/costa_concordia_sinking_what_
s_the_etiquette_for_abandoning_ship_.html. 
177 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1063–64. More specifically, rescuing anyone other 
than the first person encountered in a disaster area corresponds to a choice to switch 
tracks. There may be good reason to find the mayor and other key officials first, or to iden-
tify schools and hospitals as initial priorities, and a wholly arbitrary approach is probably 
both impractical and nonsensical. Nevertheless, however rational it may be to prioritize, 
the task carries with it heavy moral implications. See id. 
Why may, or must, the number of survivors be maximized in some instances 
but not others? The answer, I suggest, is fundamentally the same for cases in 
which one or more people must be killed so that others may live and cases in 
which only some of those imperiled can be saved . . . as when a rescue ship 
can save the passengers of only one of two capsized boats. 
Id. 
178 See Sheri Fink, The Deadly Choices at Memorial, N.Y. Times Mag., Aug. 30, 2009, at 30–
31, 34. 
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health . . . [were] categorized ‘1’s’ and prioritized first for evacuation. 
Those who were sicker and would need more assistance were ‘2’s.’ A 
final group of patients were assigned ‘3’s’ and were slated to be evacu-
ated last.”179 Even if the triage appears counterintuitive, the prioritiza-
tion is not obviously wrong if we accept that the officials did not expect 
to be able to evacuate everyone and believed that those in the hospital 
would drown regardless of their health.180 In sum, plausible reasons 
could be given for choosing different evacuation protocols. 
B. Varying Approaches 
 In each disaster response scenario, some people’s lives, health, or 
property are sacrificed for the sake of others.181 Although real-world 
scenarios are far more complex, in part because they have a “before” in 
which choices can help to create or forestall future crises, the choices 
officials confront in the midst of a disaster do resemble those hypothe-
sized in the trolley problem.182 Notably, the moral foundations for pub-
lic necessity are partial and uncertain. As a quick canvas of philosophi-
cal approaches to moral dilemmas reveals, any plausible solution must 
attain more than a reduction in overall harm. To be clear, the goal is 
not to endorse a solution to the trolley problem, but to highlight the 
inadequacy of the justification for insulating the state from legal re-
sponsibility for the harms caused by disaster tradeoffs. 
1. Simplifying Assumptions 
 Trolley problems differ from actual disaster tradeoffs in that they 
exclude all but the most salient facts. Consequently, the dramatization 
of the moral dilemmas is thin; the runaway trolley, the transplant sur-
geon, and their variants are akin to the word problems in a math text-
                                                                                                                      
179 See id. at 34. 
180 In making this observation, I am not suggesting whether the hospital officials in 
New Orleans were, in fact, motivated by these considerations. 
181 We will assume that tradeoffs are one-to-one—property for property, life for life—
and that, apart from very extreme examples, no serious argument would sacrifice human 
life to preserve other people’s property. 
182 Cf. Naomi Zack, Ethics for Disaster 34 (2009) (“[D]isaster itself, in involving 
human life and well-being, is a full-blown and real moral matter—[although] it should be 
noted that thinking morally about disaster is greatly assisted by the uses to which philoso-
phers have already put lifeboat ethics scenarios.”). 
160 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:127 
book. Each situation has a patina of realism but lacks the nuances and 
complexities of real life.183 
 In the standard version of the trolley problem, we know nothing 
about the people involved, and we are not permitted to speculate about 
factual alternatives—for instance, whether the track workers might es-
cape from the trolley’s path.184 Unless a particular hypothetical has 
been designed to test probabilistic reasoning, the consequences of dif-
ferent choices are given as certainties. Also, each trolley problem exists 
in a hermetically sealed world with no “before” and no “after” such that 
questions of costs and benefits over time cannot be used to evade the 
central dilemma.185 Indeed, simplification is the whole point of such 
hypothetical examples.186 
 Thus, although trolley problems are stories, we are not in the 
realm of narrative as argument.187 Trolley problems engage the imagi-
                                                                                                                      
 
183 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1068 (beginning with simplified assumptions, includ-
ing that the “people considered—victims and beneficiaries alike—are the same age, are in 
identical health, enjoy equal rights as members of the rescuer’s community, and are 
equally blameless or blameworthy”). 
184 This is a possibility that my law students often suggest in an understandable effort 
to sidestep the dilemma. 
185 See Sandel, supra note 64, at 24. For instance, it may be hard to ascertain the likely 
effect on social welfare of a collective decision that involves a gain in welfare for some indi-
viduals and a loss for others. See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of 
Contract 8 (1993) (“Suppose that it were proposed that a major new multi-lane highway 
be constructed through an urban area, generating gains in utility for commuters . . . but 
losses in utility to inner-city residents . . . . How can decisionmakers be confident that the 
net effect on social welfare . . . will be positive?”). For one answer to this particular ques-
tion, see Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities 14–15 (1961) 
(arguing that rational urban planning that ignores the needs of real human beings living 
in communities will produce perverse consequences). The difficulty in assessing costs and 
benefits will be particularly nettlesome if the likelihood and severity of the anticipated 
harm also involve probabilistic judgments. See Barry, supra note 23, at 257–58 (describing 
measures taken in 1927 to save New Orleans from flooding at the expense of neighboring 
parishes, and arguing that “the destruction of St. Bernard and Plaquemines was unneces-
sary [and that] [o]ne day’s wait would have shown it to be so.”). 
186 See Sandel, supra note 64, at 24. According to Professor Michael Sandel: 
Hypothetical examples such as the trolley story remove the uncertainty that 
hangs over the choices we confront in real life. They assume we know for sure 
how many will die if we don’t turn—or don’t push. This makes such stories 
imperfect guides to action. But it also makes them useful devices for moral 
analysis. By setting aside contingencies— “What if the workers noticed the 
trolley and jumped aside in time?” —hypothetical examples help us to isolate 
the moral principles at stake and examine their force. 
Id. 
187 Cf. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Derrick Bell’s Chronicle of the Space Traders: 
Would the U.S. Sacrifice People of Color If the Price Were Right?, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 321, 328 
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nation and are intended to trigger and to test moral intuitions, but they 
are highly stylized representations of reality and not themselves rich 
enough to embody any particular argument about morality. Rather, 
they help us to develop analytic tools for thinking logically about moral 
dilemmas in the real world—such as those implicated in disaster re-
sponse—by highlighting particular factors while removing other vari-
ables from consideration. Carefully controlling the variables facilitates 
analysis of their individual relevance as well as their potential interac-
tions.188 Ultimately, the goal is to identify factors that can be applied to 
moral dilemmas whether the factual circumstances involve trolley cars, 
surgeons, or any other threat to life, health, or property. 
2. Unmixed Moral Theories 
 One lesson that emerges from the study of trolley problems is that 
absolutist moral theories fail to provide consistent guidance toward the 
resolution of moral dilemmas. In some versions of the trolley problem, 
an acceptable moral outcome will follow if we focus solely on conse-
quences. In other versions, it appears that the nature of an action de-
termines its morality, regardless of its likely or actual outcome. Thus, if 
we attempt to resolve a particular moral conflict by adhering to either a 
consequential or a categorical moral theory, different trolley problems 
can be constructed to confront that moral theory with potentially mon-
strous outcomes that could follow from strict adherence to its pre-
cepts.189 
                                                                                                                      
(1991) (“Legal storytelling is a means by which representatives of new communities may 
introduce their views into the dialogue about the way society should be governed. Stories 
are in many ways more powerful than litigation or brief-writing and may be necessary pre-
cursors to law reform.”). 
188 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1068 (discussing simplified assumptions). For instance, 
we might vary the anonymity of the workers by stipulating that the lone worker is the trolley 
driver’s cousin. Now we have added an issue of family obligation that might, or might not, 
alter our view of what the driver ought to do. If we had access to the information, we might 
also want to know the age of the workers, their relative health, and, for that matter, whether 
someone was going to invent a cure for cancer should her life be spared. In the real world, as 
in the trolley world, we proceed with imperfect, limited data. See Jacob Heller, Abominable Acts, 
34 Vt. L. Rev. 311, 343 (2009) (arguing that in “trolley” moral dilemmas, the judgment made 
is intuitive since there is little time to evaluate available facts). 
189 One commentator has proposed that a third approach, virtue ethics, might help in 
extreme cases in which advance planning cannot prevent the need for a tradeoff among 
important interests. See Zack, supra note 182, at 34 (“In those cases, the right decisions will 
depend on the degree of confidence we can place in the characters of participants and 
leaders.”). 
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 For instance, categorical constraints against causing harm buckle 
as the consequences of inaction escalate. For most people, it is enough 
to ask whether to turn the trolley to kill one person or allow five people 
to die. If you are made of sterner stuff, we can change the stakes: turn 
the trolley toward one person to save fifty people; shoot an innocent 
person or an entire village will be slaughtered; torture the terrorist or 
the nuclear device will detonate in a large city. By stipulating that the 
feared result will come to pass unless you act, trolley problems test the 
resolve of nonconsequential moral commitments. At the furthest ex-
treme of the moral imagination, we must be prepared to accept either 
the destruction of the species or the obligation to cause harm, even if 
only to a single person, to prevent it.190 
 Likewise, trolley problems can expose the potential inhumanity of 
consequential reasoning. Notwithstanding the doctrine of public neces-
sity, we cannot judge actions solely by their consequences any more 
than we can ignore those consequences. Though it may be that a trolley 
driver should aim the trolley toward one person rather than allowing it 
to strike five, it seems less apparent that a bystander should be prepared 
to shove an obese person onto the track in front of the trolley if that 
would also save the five.191 Nor is it clear that a doctor should kill her 
unsuspecting patient and harvest his organs to save five other patients. 
Likewise, regardless of the overall benefits, few would countenance the 
torture of a terrorist’s innocent children in horrible ways to extract use-
ful information as quickly as possible to prevent the planned murder of 
five people.192 Again, the deliberate artificiality of these scenarios pre-
cludes objections concerning the efficacy of the methods at issue or any 
side consequences that might alter the cost-benefit analysis. In sum, 
either consequential or categorical reasoning may appear to produce 
better results in particular cases, but the fit is only contingent. Any 
plausible approach to trolley problems must produce acceptable results 
across a range of possible cases. 
                                                                                                                      
190 See Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 10 (1978) (rejecting consequential moral 
reasoning but admitting that it would be “fanatical to maintain the absoluteness of the 
judgment, to do right even if the heavens will in fact fall”). 
191 See, e.g., Sandel, supra note 64, at 22–23 (discussing this version of the trolley prob-
lem); see also Kamm, supra note 143, at 143–72 (defending the distinction between killing 
and redirecting harm). 
192 Versions of this problem that state an alternative in which a nuclear device goes off 
in a large city may overcome our horror at the prospect of torturing innocent people, but 
also reflect the categorical nature of the constraint. It is not enough to offer a modest im-
provement in overall consequences. 
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3. Mixed Solutions 
 Although this is not the place to attempt a comprehensive survey 
of philosophical approaches to trolley problems, the “redirected 
harm”193 and “hypothetical consent”194 approaches are representative, 
and offer different sets of analytic tools to grapple with disaster trade-
offs. Both approaches attempt to account for the divergence of our 
moral intuitions in cases in which achieving the best overall outcome 
may involve the deliberate infliction of harm on innocent people.195 
a. Redirected Harm 
 Some scholars contend that we should distinguish between cases in 
which the source of harm is external to the actor and cases in which 
the harm originates with the actor.196 According to this view, it is mor-
ally permissible to redirect an existing threat in order to protect as 
many people as possible, but it is not permissible to cause a different 
sort of harm, even if the goal is the same.197 Thus, it is proper to switch 
trolley tracks to save five track workers, because the same harm will be-
fall one of two groups and the actor did not originate the harm. A sur-
geon may not operate on a healthy patient to save five other patients 
who need transplanted organs, however, because the decision to oper-
ate causes harm distinct from the diseases that will otherwise claim the 
lives of the five patients in need of the transplants. 
 To put the redirected harm principle into the context of disaster 
response, consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, a flood threatens 
waterfront property, and a levee system gives public officials the ability 
to channel the water toward Lot A or Lot B. If Lot A contains expensive 
condominiums and is of much greater economic value, public officials 
might choose to divert the water toward the more modest residential 
                                                                                                                      
193 See infra notes 196–207 and accompanying text. 
194 See infra notes 208–217 and accompanying text. 
195 Again, my goal in reviewing these proposed solutions to trolley problems is to de-
rive tools for thinking about disaster tradeoffs, not to resolve the philosophical dispute. 
196 See James A. Montmarquet, On Doing Good: The Right and the Wrong Way, 79 J. Phil. 
439, 446–49 (1982) (distinguishing between a scenario in which actors already face death 
and only some can be saved and a scenario in which a new threat is created by the actor’s 
decision); Thomson, supra note 56, at 1403–04 (distinguishing various scenarios on the 
basis of whether an actor, trying to maximize the utility, infringed on the rights of others). 
197 See Thomson, supra note 56, at 1403. Professor Judith Jarvis Thomson has further 
conditioned a tradeoff based on redirected harm by stipulating that the redirection cannot 
be accomplished by “means [that] themselves constitute an infringement of any right” of 
those who would find themselves in the path of the redirected harm. See id. 
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properties located on Lot B.198 In a second scenario, the floodwaters 
threaten to engulf Lot A alone, and officials bulldoze the Lot B struc-
tures and use their ruins as a bulwark to protect Lot A. In this version, 
as with the surgeon hypothetical, deliberate harm is inflicted to provide 
the means of protecting others. Accordingly, the second scenario would 
fail the redirected harm test. 
 The principle that officials should not originate harm is also sup-
ported by its broader applicability.199 To see how this intuition might 
operate outside the context of disaster, imagine a different scenario: 
public officials exercise the power of eminent domain to seize water-
front property identical to Lot B in the first scenario described above 
and give it to a developer who creates expensive condominiums identi-
cal to Lot A.200 In this example, loosely borrowed from the 2005 U.S. 
Supreme Court case, Kelo v. City of New London,201 Lot A is created, and 
Lot B is destroyed; without Lot B’s destruction, Lot A would not exist. 
Yet, even assuming that the officials have acted in good faith to benefit 
the community, the Kelo scenario seems open to moral objection, be-
cause the officials originated the harm that befell Lot B.202 
 At a deeper level, the redirected harm approach relies in part on 
the moral principle, articulated by Immanuel Kant, that it is improper 
to use a person as a “means” rather than as an “end.”203 Human beings 
                                                                                                                      
 
198 This scenario involves the assumption that no lives are at stake, that the same num-
ber of residents would be affected in either case, and that the only issue is the protection 
of property. One could argue that economic value should be irrelevant; for purposes of 
the example, I mean to assume only that Lot A has greater social value such that a neutral 
third party would prefer that Lot A survive the disaster. 
199 See Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the 
Social Sciences 20 (2007) (stating that a principle is strengthened by its application to a 
new context, novel facts, or counterintuitive explanations). 
200 Assume that the compensation offered to the owners of Lot B is insufficient to 
compensate them for the harm they suffer in being forcibly ejected from their land. 
201 See 545 U.S. 469, 472–75 (2005). 
202 Although it may always be true that officials originate harm when they exercise the 
power of eminent domain, the choice to build a road, hospital, or sports stadium can exist 
independently of a decision concerning which current property owners to burden via the 
takings power. By contrast, in Kelo the officials decided to take land from current home-
owners in order to give it to a private developer—the economic development of the par-
ticular property was the alleged public purpose. See id. at 491–92. Numerous observers 
criticized the Kelo decision. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Essay, The Uselessness 
of Public Use, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1412, 1423 (2006); see also Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An 
American Original, 8 Green Bag 355, 357 (2005) (“Few takings cases sparked as harsh a 
reaction as did Kelo.”). 
203 See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 38 (Mary 
Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1785). Notably, one could develop an 
approach based on the “ends” versus “means” distinction that does not also rely on redi-
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are not mere instruments to be used to achieve a particular result.204 
Thus, we can distinguish cases in which the death of an innocent by-
stander is an incidental consequence of an action and when it is the 
direct means for achieving the end of saving more lives.205 It could be 
appropriate, therefore, to cause a trolley car to switch tracks, even 
knowing that a helpless person is on the alternate track, because the 
intention is not to use that person’s life to save the others. Rather, the 
death is an unintended, though foreseeable, by-product of an action 
taken to save the five on the other track. Conversely, a surgeon acts 
immorally if she kills one healthy patient in order to harvest his organs 
for the benefit of several other patients—here, the healthy patient is 
made the means to the salvation of the others. Or, to cite a common 
trolley car example, it would be wrong to push an obese man onto the 
tracks in front of the trolley in order to stop it from killing five inno-
cent track workers.206 
 If accepted, the redirected harm principle (and the underlying 
distinction between treating people as “means” rather than as “ends”) 
could account for many situations in which public officials seek to di-
vert flood or fire damage in order to minimize harm, as well as triage 
choices in which public officials cannot save everyone. To be clear, any 
particular decision would still be open to criticism—for instance, if the 
choices were made in an arbitrary or biased fashion—but the inherent 
tradeoffs would not themselves violate moral principles. 
 One notable objection to the redirected harm principle is that the 
difference is merely “phenomenological” —that is, although “it might 
feel more dastardly” to shove the obese man onto the tracks rather than 
to turn the wheel of the trolley, the source of the harm is not relevant 
                                                                                                                      
rected harm. See, e.g., Michael J. Costa, The Trolley Problem Revisited, 24 S.J. Phil. 437, 437–
42 (1986) (using the doctrine of double effect to distinguish actions that properly treat 
individuals as “ends” from those that use them as “means”); Warren S. Quinn, Actions, In-
tentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, 98 Phil. Rev. 287, 288–90 
(1989) (distinguishing between action that causes harm and inaction that allows harm to 
occur). 
204 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1071 (arguing that approaches to the trolley prob-
lem that rest on Kantian considerations all hold that “killing somebody in a way that makes 
him a direct instrument for saving one or more other persons is impermissible, except 
perhaps if the number of lives saved or the good achieved is very much greater than the 
evil of using somebody as a means by killing him”). 
205 See id. As Professor Eric Rakowski has summarized, “Several proposed answers to 
the question of when one may kill to save lives rely crucially upon the notion that a person 
is used impermissibly as a means to enhance the welfare of others when he is intentionally 
made a causal antecedent of their salvation.” Id. 
206 See Sandel, supra note 64, at 22–23. 
166 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:127 
to whether we are satisfying Kant’s moral requirement that we treat 
others as “ends” and not “means.”207 Neither the obese man nor the 
lone track worker has any agency—we decide what will happen and act 
accordingly. Thus, treating others as beings worthy of equal respect re-
quires more than an examination of the source of the harm. 
b. Hypothetical Consent 
 An alternative approach to the trolley problem seeks to hew more 
closely to the Kantian imperative by asking whether, hypothetically, the 
victims would have agreed to a rule designed to save the most people if 
asked before knowing whether they would be the ones saved.208 This 
approach, in more detail, is as follows: 
[P]eople may . . . be killed to save a larger number of others if 
. . . a majority of those affected by a life-saving decision either 
endorsed a policy maximizing the number of lives saved or 
would have welcomed that policy in the circumstances in 
which they found themselves were they aware of their moral 
and religious beliefs, their desires and aversion to risk, and 
their personal abilities and history, but ignorant of whether 
they would be killed or saved under the policy.209 
In other words, “paternalistic intervention” is acceptable because, un-
der the circumstances, a person is treated “in the manner he would 
have chosen had he been free from the pressures of his life-threatening 
predicament.”210 
 For example, it seems rational to prefer a rule that directs trolley 
drivers to avoid as many people as possible, even if that means switch-
ing tracks toward an innocent person. From the standpoint of self-
interest, a rule that maximizes lives saved is more likely to work to our 
benefit than a rule that forbids the driver from altering course. Odds 
                                                                                                                      
207 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1096. 
208 See id. at 1065 (emphasizing the importance of “[a]cting towards those in danger as 
they would have wanted one to act—not as imaginary rational people . . . would have cho-
sen”). 
209 Id. Professor Rakowski takes into account the interests of “those who dissent or who 
would have dissented for either moral or religious reasons (and not so that they could ride 
free) . . . and who would be killed if the greater number were saved,” but permits the ma-
jority’s desire for a maximizing tradeoff if the dissenters could not be excluded from the 
benefits and their chances of survival would be improved by adoption of a maximizing 
scheme. Id. 
210 Id. 
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are greater that we will be one of the five than the lone track worker.211 
By contrast, we might not endorse a rule in which healthy patients 
could be sacrificed to save sick patients—as a form of quasi-insurance, 
we would be subsidizing unhealthy habits and also damaging the rela-
tionship of trust between doctors and patients.212 
 The hypothetical consent approach gives a method for thinking 
about tradeoffs that have not been decided in advance. For instance, it 
is very unlikely that those who may find themselves trapped on a life-
boat and running out of food will have given thought to whether can-
nibalism would be an acceptable alternative to starvation, and, if so, 
how to select the victims.213 Indeed, a hypothetical consent approach 
explicitly excludes cases in which preexisting law governs the outcome, 
focusing instead on cases in which a decisionmaker has no knowledge 
of “any explicit agreement intended to guide her decision by those she 
might save or kill and situations in which no agreement exists.”214 The 
runaway trolley is a paradigmatic example, because the trolley driver 
and track workers have not communicated previously and there is no 
opportunity for them to do so once the trolley’s brakes have failed. 
 As with any approach to decision making that rests upon what the 
parties would have decided, however, outcomes depend upon our as-
sumptions about human motivation. This, in turn, restates the more 
fundamental questions about morality, at least as an empirical matter. If 
people behave like the utility-maximizing rational actor of neoclassical 
economics, for instance, we may assume that they will generally choose 
rules that maximize their expected individual benefits and that ends 
                                                                                                                      
211 See id. (“[I]f somebody would reasonably have favored killing under certain circum-
stances—because, for example, that course would tend to maximize the number of lives 
saved and thus antecedently reduce her own risk of dying—then killing that person to save 
others is morally permissible, or even commendable.”). But see Judith Jarvis Thomson, 
The Realm of Rights 180–81 (1990) (pointing out that better odds would not be realized 
if the lone worker was a beam fitter, assuming beam fitters always work alone, in which case 
a bystander may not turn the trolley towards the one). 
212 See Thomson, supra note 211, at 183–84. Although the choice may be purely hypo-
thetical—no such vote would ever take place, and the doctor-patient relationship would 
not actually be harmed by the secret killing of a healthy patient—the hypothetical chooser 
would feel differently about going to the doctor after consenting to the sacrifice of healthy 
patients, and therefore, would take this adverse consequence into account. Thus, the deci-
sion whether to kill a healthy patient cannot rely on the logic of hypothetical consent if 
that consent would not have been given had there been time and motivation to deliberate 
in advance. 
213 See generally Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, [1884] 14 Q.B.D. 273 (Eng.) (involving 
the murder and consumption of a cabin boy by starving sailors). For a different sort of 
lifeboat problem, see supra notes 56–63. 
214 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1068. 
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will feature more prominently than means.215 On the other hand, if we 
recognize the value that people ascribe to social connections and fair-
ness, we will give more weight to categorical constraints on actions that 
cause harm.216 For instance, individuals motivated by fairness might not 
agree to sacrifice human beings simply as means to an end. Thus, the 
hypothetical approach authorizes us to apply ordinary moral intuition, 
but it does not provide independent answers. Also, the hypothetical 
consent approach seeks to mimic what would have been decided by an 
individual or community—thus emphasizing the importance of what 
those affected by an emergency would want—but does not address the 
question of whether an actual decision could or should have been 
made before the crisis.217 
C. An Unavoidable Tragedy 
 In an important sense, disaster tradeoffs and trolley problems have 
no morally satisfactory answer; tradeoffs that involve the sacrifice of life 
or other fundamental values are always fundamentally tragic.218 The 
insight here is not new; the calamity of choosing when the choice nec-
essarily entails the sacrifice of crucial moral values is featured in Greek 
tragedy. For instance, in Sophocles’ play, Antigone, King Creon has for-
bidden the burial of a traitor and Antigone must choose whether to 
obey his edict and her obligations as a citizen or to honor her duties as 
a family member.219 A choice can be justified (or at least excused) with-
out lessening our regret over the choice. 
                                                                                                                      
215 See Hanoch Dagan, Between Rationality and Benevolence: The Happy Ambivalence of Law 
and Legal Theory, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 191, 192 (2010) (“Law’s conventional story assumes that 
its subjects are rational maximizers of their self-interest.”). 
216 See id. at 199 (contending that human behavior is more complex and that “people 
. . . are indeed self-interested and potentially other-regarding and community-seeking”). 
217 See Zack, supra note 182, at 26 (“Broad public discussion of the allocation of limited 
resources in emergencies should be a vital component of disaster preparation in a democ-
ratic society.”). 
218 See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
29 J. Legal Stud. 1005, 1007 (2000) (noting that a tragic question arises when there is no 
right answer, and describing such a tragic question as a situation in which “all the possible 
answers to the obvious question, including the best one, are bad, involving serious moral 
wrongdoing”); Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 
160, 160 (1973) (examining the choice between two equally wrong courses of action). 
219 See Sophocles, Antigone, in The Three Theban Plays: Antigone, Oedipus the 
King, Oedipus at Colonus 55, 61–63 (Robert Fagles trans., 1984). 
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 Trolley problems are difficult because the alternatives are all un-
palatable.220 In cases of serious moral conflict, it is not necessarily true 
that further deliberation will indicate that one of our moral beliefs is 
false, and that we can proceed unperturbed with the correct course of 
action.221 Rather, “it is surely falsifying of moral thought to represent its 
logic as demanding that in a conflict situation one of the conflicting 
thoughts must be totally rejected.”222 At a minimum, it is not irrational 
for an individual to feel regret.223 
 Accordingly, public choices involve more than a weighing of de-
sired outcomes against the cost of achieving them. Even in the simplest 
version of the trolley problem, there is something troubling about turn-
ing the trolley to aim at an innocent person, even if the rationale for 
doing so—avoiding the death of five other innocent people—is sound. 
As one scholar has observed, reducing public decision making to cost-
benefit analysis risks obscuring the moral complexity of our choices.224 
If morality were nothing more than utilitarian calculation, the problem 
of dirty hands could not arise: “Even when [a public official] lies and 
tortures, his hands will be clean, for he has done what he should as best 
he can, standing alone in a moment of time, forced to choose.”225 
                                                                                                                      
220 See Nussbaum, supra note 218, at 1007 (distinguishing between “obvious” and 
“tragic” questions). As Professor Martha Nussbaum has observed, the “obvious” question—
what to do—may actually be quite difficult to answer. See id. But this difficulty is distinct 
from the deeper realization that no answer to a problem can be adequate to our moral 
obligations—this is the “tragic” question. See id. 
221 See Williams, supra note 150, at 122. 
222 Id. at 134. 
223 See id. at 122–23. “The notion of an admirable moral agent cannot be all that re-
mote from that of a decent human being, and decent human beings are disposed in some 
situations of conflict to have the sort of reactions I am talking about.” Id. at 123. Some 
scholars concede that people will feel these emotions, but maintain nevertheless that “an 
adequate moral theory must rule out genuine dilemmas.” See Terrance C. McConnell, 
Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics, in Moral Dilemmas, supra note 149, at 154, 155; 
Williams, supra note 150, at 123. This Article does not take a position as to whether moral 
dilemmas are “genuine” when “there are overriding moral reasons for acting on one 
rather than the other [moral consideration].” McConnell, supra, at 155. Rather, the point 
is that the outweighed moral considerations are not thereby extinguished—it is this fea-
ture that makes it possible to regret an action that one feels was correct. 
224 See Nussbaum, supra note 218, at 1007–08 (“Too much reliance on cost-benefit 
analysis as a general method of public choice can . . . distract us from an issue of major 
importance, making us believe that we have only one question on our hands, when in fact 
we have at least two.”). Those questions are what we should do under the circumstances 
and whether any available choice can be morally justified. See id. at 1007. 
225 Walzer, supra note 218, at 169 (noting that this is a very “improbable” account of 
morality, in part because our moral views are socially constructed and a theory of morality 
that does not grapple with our deeply held beliefs cannot be useful). 
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 Two consequences follow from the recognition of tragedy in disas-
ter tradeoffs. First, there is an obligation to avoid, or at the very least to 
mitigate, harm.226 Within the trolley car scenario, for instance, we 
might ask why the track workers were on tracks in active use, whether 
there was a warning signal system in place to alert trolley drivers to the 
presence of workers on the tracks, how the tracks were designed and 
maintained, and whether the trolley’s brakes had been properly ser-
viced. In this case, we are asking the standard questions of tort law.227 A 
trolley owner who failed to take basic precautions ought not to be able 
to invoke a doctrine of necessity to excuse the loss of life that results 
from that negligence, even if, viewed in isolation, the tradeoff chosen 
during the emergency that results is appropriate given those avoidable 
circumstances. 
 Second, when a tradeoff cannot be avoided, the “recognition that 
one has ‘dirty hands’ is not just self-indulgence: it has significance for 
future actions.”228 In particular, “[i]t informs the chooser that he may 
owe reparations to the vanquished and an effort to rebuild their lives 
after the disaster that will have been inflicted upon them.”229 Section 
196 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts affirms the existence of a moral 
obligation to provide compensation for property damage in public ne-
cessity situations: 
Although the moral obligation to compensate the person 
whose property has been damaged or destroyed for the pub-
lic good is obviously very great, and is of the kind which 
should be recognized by the law, the rules as to governmen-
tal immunity for suit have stood in the past as a barrier to 
                                                                                                                      
226 See Zack, supra, note 182, at 22 (advocating “Save All Who Can Be Saved” as an 
ethical principle for disaster response rather than the more modest goal, “Save the Great-
est Number”). As Professor Naomi Zack has explained, the more ambitious approach re-
quires significant advance planning, whereas “Save the Greatest Number” fails to avoid 
departures from ordinary morality and “is morally limited because the greatest number 
who can be saved depends on the context in question.” Id. 
227 If negligence is understood in economic terms to involve the reduction of accident 
costs to an efficient level, however, the ethical requirements for disaster planning may go 
further. See id. at 24 (contending, as a first position, “that we should not plan in advance 
how to allocate scarce resources because we should not accept such scarcity while there is 
time to augment resources or otherwise adequately prepare”). 
228 Nussbaum, supra note 218, at 1009. 
229 Id. (observing that “[w]hen the recognition is public, it constitutes an acknowl-
edgment of moral culpability, something that frequently has significance in domestic and 
international politics”); see also Williams, supra note 150, at 122 (“[T]he moral impulse that 
had to be abandoned in the choice may find a new object, and I may try, for instance, to 
‘make up’ to people involved for the claim that was neglected.”). 
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any effective legal remedy. After major public disaster com-
pensation often has been paid under special legislation en-
acted for the purpose and in several jurisdictions general 
statutes provide for such compensation.230 
Providing compensation would help to address the problem that those 
whose property has the least economic value are most likely to be sacri-
ficed. Indeed, despite notable failures, there is broad societal consensus 
across the political spectrum that we have a moral obligation to miti-
gate disaster harm.231 
 Put in trolley car terms, if the state chooses to sacrifice one person 
to save five, it ought to compensate the family of the one who was sacri-
ficed. Because we are all vulnerable to harm, we all live on trolley 
tracks, and any sacrifice should be shared. Although questions of social 
justice do not necessarily turn on economic efficiency, the willingness 
of those spared to compensate those harmed would also evidence the 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency of the tradeoff—that the choice generates a 
value for society sufficient to compensate the losers while still leaving 
the winners better off.232 
                                                                                                                      
230 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 196 cmt. h (1965). Some jurisdictions statuto-
rily provide for compensation for property damage incurred as a matter of public neces-
sity. See George C. Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered from the Legal and Moral Points of 
View, 48 Duke L.J. 975, 995–96 (1999); supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
231 See Address to the Nation on Hurricane Katrina Recovery from New Orleans, Lou-
isiana, 2 Pub. Papers 1439–44 (Sept. 15, 2005). In response to the devastation caused by 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, President George W. Bush remarked: 
We have also witnessed the kind of desperation no citizen of this great and 
generous nation should ever have to know: fellow Americans calling out for 
food and water, vulnerable people left at the mercy of criminals who had no 
mercy, and the bodies of the dead lying uncovered and untended in the 
street. 
Id. 
232 See Posner, supra note 16, at 13; supra note 16 and accompanying text (providing 
more information on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency); see also Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency 
and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 241, 248–59 (2000) 
(discussing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and concluding that it lacks moral importance). The 
Kaldor-Hicks heuristic should not be pushed too far, however, as it might seem to elevate 
economic considerations over other factors in assessing the costs of possible disaster trade-
offs. See Adler, supra, at 245–46. If economic factors, such as the market value of affected 
property interests, are to be given a higher priority than considerations that are less easily 
monetized, those priorities ought to be assigned through a transparent, political process 
and not simply built into the model for assessing tradeoffs. 
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IV. The Limits of Law? 
 If the defense of public necessity seems difficult to reconcile with 
takings law, we might conclude that disasters fall outside the ordinary 
framework of law and that state actors must simply do the best that they 
can, exercising unlimited and essentially unchecked emergency pow-
ers.233 This Part contends, however, that natural disasters should not 
suspend the rule of law.234 Without legal constraints on official action, 
we cannot be assured that the actions of public officials will reflect our 
shared values.235 Further, this Part contrasts the binary choice called for 
in trolley problems with the complexities—institutional, procedural, 
and temporal—of public disaster response, and argues that emergen-
cies do not excuse a failure to engage in comprehensive advance plan-
ning. 
 Section A argues that the values at stake in disaster tradeoffs are 
deeply contested, and that political process matters; communities that 
may be impacted should have a voice in shaping the legal rules that will 
apply when a disaster strikes.236 Section B then responds to the objec-
tion that extraordinary crises requiring the compromise of core values 
fall outside the scope of law and should be resolved as necessity re-
quires.237 The invocation of necessity as an extralegal concept ignores 
                                                                                                                      
233 See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1375, 1381 (2011) (ob-
serving that emergency response rules tend to afford state actors wide discretion, because 
decisions cannot be made in the absence of information, and the information is not avail-
able until a crisis occurs); Jules Lobel, Comment, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberal-
ism, 98 Yale L.J. 1385, 1407–10 (1989) (discussing Congress allowing for the exercise of 
broad emergency powers during disasters, and noting that as a result of an “excessive and 
uncontrolled” delegation of emergency authority to violate laws, such authority itself has 
become routine and lawful). 
234 See Super, supra note 233, at 1380 (noting that exercising discretion instead of fol-
lowing the law is often suboptimal—by the time information gathering is maximized so as 
to best inform decision making, the number and quality of options may be diminished, 
and the best options may no longer be available). One scholar has further noted that too 
much flexibility in the exercise of discretion can lead to paralysis, and has argued that the 
“hurried exercise of discretion” can be defective. See id. Instead, the “rule of law” includes 
norms of like treatment and advance notice. See id. at 1377 (“Invocations of ‘the rule of 
law’ may be demands for consistent treatment, but they are just as likely to be pleas to re-
solve issues under rules specified in advance.”). 
235 See Zack, supra note 182, at 64 (“No matter how important the virtues of integrity 
and diligence are for individual cultivation, contemporary disasters require a broader pub-
lic responsibility on the part of what is generically understood to be ‘government’ and its 
public policies.”). 
236 See infra notes 239–259 and accompanying text; see also Shapiro, supra note 139, at 
35–39 (endorsing local decisions and participation in collective self-governance by indi-
viduals with interests expected to be impacted by the collective action at issue). 
237 See infra notes 260–270 and accompanying text. 
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the critical role of disaster planning: to minimize harm, to mitigate 
vulnerability, and, more broadly, to reflect society’s priorities. Finally, 
Section C contends that an ad hoc approach to disaster tradeoffs would 
also give short shrift to social justice concerns.238 Disaster harms often 
follow from preexisting social inequality; leaving those harmed by gov-
ernment choices during disaster response to bear their own losses 
would only exacerbate the problem. 
A. Process Constraints 
 Although few would deny the general utility of legal guidelines for 
disaster response, or the importance of clearly assigned institutional re-
sponsibilities, it does not necessarily follow that specific disaster trade-
offs should be subject to legal constraint. If the correct course of action 
only becomes apparent in the midst of a crisis, legal rules could inter-
fere either by dictating a different and suboptimal result or by imposing 
bureaucratic delays.239 Yet, this assumes that we can, in theory, separate 
substance and process. In fact, the defensibility of a substantive outcome 
follows from the fairness or unfairness of the underlying procedure. 
 Consider the famous case of United States v. Holmes, decided by the 
then-Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1842, in 
which a lifeboat was adrift at sea and in danger of sinking.240 If all lives 
were not to be lost, some of those onboard would have to be cast over 
the side to drown. Sailors stood ready to obey the mate’s command as 
ranking officer. But how was he to choose who should be killed? The 
order was as follows: 
The mate directed the crew “not to part man and wife, and not 
to throw over any women.” There was no other principle of se-
lection. There was no evidence of combination among the 
crew. No lots were cast, nor had the passengers, at any time, 
been either informed or consulted as to what was now done.241 
 The crew ejected fourteen male passengers from the lifeboat, and 
the remaining passengers and crew were later rescued.242 The mate’s 
                                                                                                                      
 
238 See infra notes 271–286 and accompanying text. 
239 See Super, supra note 233, at 1380 (contending that time spent gathering informa-
tion before making a decision can exceed the benefit when it is more important to be 
decisive than perfect). 
240 26 F. Cas. 360, 361 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383). 
241 Id. at 361–62. 
242 Id. In this regard, the court felt obliged to observe that “[n]ot one of the crew was 
cast over. One of them, the cook, was a negro.” Id. At the time of the decision, it appears 
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decision preserved many lives and seems to have had the merit of expe-
dience, at the least. Without too much difficulty, however, we can imag-
ine a number of alternatives that might also have produced the same 
result (albeit with different distributive consequences): (1) majority 
vote;243 (2) casting lots;244 (3) throwing people overboard according to 
their weight, regardless of gender or status;245 (4) throwing people 
overboard according to their age or health, regardless of gender or 
status; (5) requiring the sailors to sacrifice themselves to protect the pas-
sengers entrusted to their care; (6) prioritizing the mate and as many 
sailors as would be necessary to operate the lifeboat safely, and then put-
ting the remaining sailors overboard, and, if necessary, choosing addi-
tional passengers according to one of the other methods listed above; 
and (7) doing nothing so that all would drown together unless enough 
people volunteered to drown to save the rest before it was too late. 
 In a subsequent criminal prosecution, the mate stood trial for 
manslaughter.246 The court applied a fiduciary theory and instructed 
the jury that if there were more sailors than needed to operate the 
boat, “the supernumerary sailors have no right, for their safety, to sacri-
fice the passengers.”247 Assuming that the sailors and passengers all had 
an equal right to live, however, the court further instructed that draw-
ing lots would have been “the fairest mode, and, in some sort, as an ap-
peal to God, for selection of the victim.”248 The lawyer for the accused 
                                                                                                                      
that a further principle of selection would have prioritized white over non-white persons, 
regardless of status. 
243 Various procedures for balloting and voting could, of course, impact the outcome. 
See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, “Protecting the People from Themselves,” or How Direct Can Democ-
racy Be?, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1717, 1729, 1773–74 (1998) (discussing various voting models); 
Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U. 
Chi. Legal F. 241, 242–43 (analyzing cumulative voting and comparing alternative voting 
systems). 
244 See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American 
Constitution 139 (1996) (arguing that drawing straws is the fairest way to determine who 
will be sacrificed). Professor Ronald Dworkin disapproves of voting because many forces, 
such as “kinship, friendships, enmities, [and] jealousies . . . that should not make a differ-
ence will then be decisive.” See id. This “lot casting” method, however, could also be com-
bined with preconditions. For instance, the female passengers might have been excluded 
so that lots would be drawn by only the male passengers and crew. 
245 The idea would be to reduce the total number of lives lost, if the displaced weight 
of the heaviest people on the boat could make it possible to survive with fewer sacrificed 
lives. 
246 Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 363. 
247 Id. at 367. 
248 Id. 
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argued that the procedure of drawing lots was neither practically avail-
able nor likely to produce a better substantive outcome.249 
 The question of choice could have been deliberated not at the 
time of emergency, but earlier in anticipation of like emergencies.250 
The rule of law exists to guide behavior, even “at midnight, in a sinking 
boat.”251 Because several methods of sorting the members of the life-
boat appear possible, and none are obviously correct, a legal rule for 
tradeoffs of this kind would reduce confusion rather than engender 
it.252 
 Even if we were to examine the lifeboat situation as an example of 
a trolley problem, the applicability of a necessity defense for the mate’s 
order remains unclear. Neither the redirected harm nor the hypotheti-
cal consent approaches canvassed in the previous Part produce clear 
answers.253 First, whether the harm has been redirected or is newly 
originated depends on how we frame the issue. Throwing someone out 
of a boat is a violent act, like operating on a healthy patient to harvest 
organs for the use of others.254 On the other hand, everyone on the 
boat would otherwise have drowned, and the mate arguably redirected 
the threatened harm toward a few individuals so that the majority 
would survive. Unlike the surgeon hypothetical, those sacrificed would 
                                                                                                                      
249 See id. at 365 (reporting the defense counsel’s argument that it was unheard of to 
cast lots “at midnight, in a sinking boat, in the midst of darkness, of rain, of terrour, and of 
confusion”). The defense lawyer further argued that the sailors “adopted the only princi-
ple of selection which was possible in an emergency like theirs . . . a principle more hu-
mane than lots. Man and wife were not torn asunder, and the women were all preserved. 
Lots would have rendered impossible this clear dictate of humanity.” Id. 
250 See Wendy F. Hensel & Leslie E. Wolf, Playing God: The Legality of Plans Denying Scarce 
Resources to People with Disabilities in Public Health Emergencies, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 719, 721 (2011) 
(noting that decisions consciously made in anticipation of emergency are likely to be more 
fair and reasoned than those made in the “midst of a full-blown disaster”); Jeremy Wal-
dron, A Majority in the Lifeboat, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1043, 1051, 1055 (2010). 
251 See Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 365. 
252 See Robin Miskolcze, Women & Children First: Nineteenth-Century Sea 
Narratives & American Identity 25–66 (2007) (discussing the development of evacua-
tion priorities and the cultural values they embody). Giving advance scrutiny to the hor-
rors of such tradeoffs might also lead to sensible seafaring rules requiring that vessels have 
lifeboats adequate to handle all passengers and crew and that these lifeboats be regularly 
maintained. See generally International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278 (prescribing some international seafaring 
safety standards). 
253 See supra notes 193–217 and accompanying text. 
254 See supra notes 193–217 and accompanying text. 
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not otherwise have lived, unless, of course, other individuals were sacri-
ficed or volunteered to die instead.255 
 The question of hypothetical consent is also unclear because it de-
pends on how we draw the “veil of ignorance.”256 A male passenger 
traveling alone might not consent to be sacrificed so that others could 
live, and might instead insist upon drawing lots.257 If we wanted to 
avoid the influence of an individual’s particular circumstances, we 
would need to ask a disembodied (neither male nor female) 
chooser.258 This hypothetical decisionmaker would also be ignorant of 
whether, if male, he would be a member of the crew, a single passenger, 
or a passenger with a female companion also onboard. The hypotheti-
cal choice produced by this procedure, however, would have nothing to 
do with the actual consent of those on the lifeboat.259 
 In sum, as the lifeboat case illustrates, the substantive and proce-
dural aspects of justice are not easily disentangled. On the one hand, 
inadequate decision processes can render tradeoffs unjust that might 
otherwise have been defensible. On the other hand, a robust process 
can bolster tradeoffs, even when difficult decisions are unavoidable. 
                                                                                                                      
255 See Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1091–92 (discussing the view that anybody “who can 
be killed by pointing the [preexisting] threatening force wherever it is causally possible to 
aim it—can be killed to maximize the number of people kept alive”). One scholar notes 
that according to this view, it does not matter “whether those in range are killed by the pre-
existing threat or by some newly created force.” Id. 
256 The term “veil of ignorance” is borrowed from John Rawls, who sought to formu-
late principles of justice through the use of a hypothetical decision procedure. See Rawls, 
supra note 59, at 136–38. 
257 See Thomson, supra note 211, at 180–81 (discussing the hypothetical beam fitter 
who always works alone, and arguing that this beam fitter would decline to waive his right 
not to be killed even if doing so would maximize the number of lives saved). 
258 Others have suggested different approaches. Compare Thomson, supra note 211, at 
180–81 (concluding that aiming the trolley at a lone worker such as a beam fitter is im-
permissible), with Rakowski, supra note 61, at 1127–29 (arguing that aiming the trolley at a 
lone worker such as a beam fitter may be permissible depending, for example, on when or 
how jobs are assigned, whether beam fitters are paid a risk premium, and the possibility of 
transfer from a beam fitting position). 
259 See Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2203, 2305 
(1992) (discussing the problematic nature of hypothetical consent). Nevertheless, even if 
the fiction of hypothetical consent makes it troublesome to apply, the focus on human 
agreement rather than abstract moral injunction provides a different, more political per-
spective from which to approach moral dilemmas. In particular, the need to achieve con-
sent represents the standpoint from which public deliberation of a legal rule might pro-
ceed. See Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? 7 (2004) 
(defining deliberative democracy as a “form of government in which free and equal citi-
zens (and their representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one an-
other reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible”). 
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B. The “Dirty Hands” Problem 
 Another possible objection to the formulation of legal rules for 
disaster response is that, if the tradeoffs called for in disaster response 
violate foundational moral or legal requirements, then it may be better 
to deal with emergencies as circumstances demand according to a doc-
trine of necessity rather than by pretending that our legal system can 
accommodate the compromise of its core values.260 Moreover, unlike a 
trolley car driver’s decision, the choices made by public officials in the 
context of disaster can create precedents for the suspension of liber-
ties.261 Thus, it might be the case that stretching the law to cover disas-
ter emergencies could debase the law without improving the quality of 
those decisions. 
 In other words, hard questions should be resolved according to an 
ad hoc principle of necessity rather than by reference to established 
law.262 These arguments are sometimes bolstered with telling examples, 
such as the ticking time bomb or the runaway trolley car. If there is no 
time to reflect, and if the alternatives are all unpalatable, it is best just 
to choose and have done with it. Pretending that the law can provide 
an appropriate answer will only diminish respect for the rule of law.263 
                                                                                                                      
260 See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitu-
tional?, 112 Yale L.J. 1011, 1014–15, 1019 (2003) (describing a “downward cycle” when the 
response to successive disasters leads to ever more repressive laws, and arguing that in 
times of national crises, “democratic nations tend to race to the bottom as far as the pro-
tection of human rights and civil liberties . . . is concerned”). 
261 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 220 (1944) (upholding the com-
pulsory exclusion of Japanese Americans during World War II due to circumstances of 
“emergency and peril”); see also Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 
361–64 (1985) (discussing the slippery slope of a desirable restriction leading to another, 
“increasingly invidious” one). As one commentator notes, “emergencies suspend, or at 
least redefine, de facto, if not de jure, much of our cherished freedoms and rights.” See 
Gross, supra note 260, at 1019. 
262 See Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming Necessity: Torture and the State of Constitutional Cul-
ture, 61 SMU L. Rev. 221, 224 (2008) (noting that “[n]ecessity arguments claim that in 
particular circumstances officials may undertake exceptional actions to achieve their le-
gitimate goals, such as protecting national security, that would otherwise be prohibited if 
the normal rule of law governed during normal conditions”). 
263 See id. at 226 (arguing that when officials act “outside the constraints of fundamen-
tal law, the domain of law remains unsullied, but action taken according to necessity be-
comes lawless”). Professor Thomas Crocker has counseled caution, arguing that we should 
“overcome the temptation to rely on necessity . . . when doing so threatens to alter our 
broader commitments to living under constitutional constraints reflected in rights-
protecting and separation of power principles.” Id. at 227; see also Thomas P. Crocker, Presi-
dential Power and Constitutional Responsibility, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1551, 1608–09, 1613 (2011) 
(arguing that constitutional values limit the president’s power to do what is “necessary”). 
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 In the broadest sense, an objection to extending the rule of law to 
exceptional, morally compromised choices seems misplaced because it 
misunderstands the nature of public decision making. One scholar, for 
instance, has pointed out that public life seems to require that even 
“good men” commit moral wrongs for which they ought to feel guilty so 
that they can accomplish greater utilitarian ends for society.264 It is not 
possible to be effective in public life, in other words, unless one is will-
ing to have dirty hands. We understand this about politicians; we want 
them to be effective.265 The notion that the public must be protected 
from knowledge that the world does not always align neatly and that 
values can conflict seems both patronizing and self-defeating.266 Our 
conception of the rule of law must not be so brittle that it cannot with-
stand contact with reality. 
 Nor does the objection to legal rules for moral dilemmas seem ap-
plicable in the context of disaster response. With respect to disaster 
tradeoffs, the question is not so much whether or not we will have dirty 
hands—it may be that all available options involve the loss of life—but 
how those choices will be made and whether we are willing, collectively, 
to own up to the consequences. A moral response to disaster cannot 
ignore law, because law represents collective judgment, and only 
through full community participation can we derive appropriate rules 
for triage. 
 In this vein, one scholar has argued that our interests in disaster 
planning must stem from what we individually feel is just, meaning, 
what we would want as justice for ourselves because we are all vulner-
able to disaster harm.267 As the scholar explains, “If there is a prior con-
sensus that our moral rules are not absolute but subject to exceptions 
in unusual situations, then we need to clarify what the exceptions are 
before they occur.”268 Such clarification should be resolved through the 
political process rather than apart from it: 
                                                                                                                      
264 See Walzer, supra note 218, at 165. 
265 See id. 
266 See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Isaiah Berlin, Liberty 166, 212 (Henry 
Hardy ed., 2002) (criticizing the “ancient faith [which] rests on the conviction that all the 
positive values in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and perhaps 
even entail one another”). 
267 See Zack supra note 182, at 25–26. This argument can be seen as an application of 
the hypothetical approach to trolley problems. See id.; see also Martha Albertson Fineman, 
The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 Emory L.J. 251, 266–69 (2010) (describing 
the human condition as one of vulnerability). 
268 Zack, supra note 182, at 40. 
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There is nothing wrong with providing exceptions or specifi-
cations to our moral principles before the fact of a disaster 
and then applying those specifications when the time comes. 
But there is clearly something suspect in making up the ex-
ceptions and specifications in the moment of a disaster be-
cause that opens the door to mere rationalization and justifi-
cation after the fact.269 
Thus, rather than complacent acceptance of the dirty hands of those 
who make tradeoffs on our behalf, deliberation and rulemaking would 
improve the quality of disaster decision making and avoid situations in 
which a person’s life is sacrificed according to a principle that he did 
not select, was not aware of, and had no opportunity to influence.270
 The stylized emergency situations represented by trolley problems 
can obscure the extent to which disaster tradeoffs ought to be antici-
pated and made subject to comprehensive planning that seeks to 
minimize the need for sacrifice and to arrive at rules for necessary 
tradeoffs through an open, deliberative process. In a democratic soci-
ety, law can allocate benefits and burdens so that tradeoffs reflect our 
commitment to self-government and shared sacrifice rather than an 
expedient victimization of the already vulnerable. 
C. Social Justice After Disaster 
 A natural disaster is, in the first instance, a misnomer. Whether 
natural phenomena become disasters is “contingent upon human ex-
posure and a lack of capacity to cope.”271 Although we are all vulner-
                                                                                                                      
269 Id. at 41. 
270 If it were published as law of the sea that single male passengers can expect to be 
first to go over the side in an overcrowded lifeboat (or to be left on ship), those passengers 
might choose not to travel, insist on paying a reduced fare, or insist on documentation of 
safety compliance. I do not mean to suggest that most individuals are fully rational actors 
and would adjust their behavior to an efficient level given their risk tolerance, but I do 
contend that anyone who may be exposed to harm deserves the fullest possible disclosure. 
See supra notes 181–217 and accompanying text (discussing annual notices given to indi-
viduals living in areas subject to flooding describing the consequences if nearby levees are 
opened). 
271 Mark Pelling, Paradigms of Risk, in Natural Disasters and Development in a 
Globalizing World 3, 4 (Mark Pelling ed., 2003) (noting that natural disaster is a “hu-
manitarian disaster with a natural trigger”); see also Ben Aguirre et al., Institutional Resilience 
and Disaster Planning for New Hazards: Insights from Hospitals, 2 J. Homeland Security & 
Emergency Mgmt. 1, 1 (2005) (quoting the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
definition of “disaster” as an “ecological disruption causing human, material, or environ-
mental losses that exceed the ability of the affected community to cope using its own re-
sources, often calling for outside assistance”). 
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able to disaster,272 those without access to resources generally suffer the 
greatest harm.273 According to social geographers who have studied the 
vulnerability of social systems to natural hazards, the “dominant com-
ponent” in measuring social vulnerability is socioeconomic status.274 
Other components that increase social vulnerability include race and 
ethnicity.275 Put another way, “[d]isasters are income neutral and color-
blind. Their impacts, however, are not.”276 
 Along similar lines, two sociologists who have written about the 
inadequacy of the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina define 
a social disaster as “predicated upon and exacerbated by structural ine-
quality and human decisionmaking.”277 These sociologists conclude 
that “[s]ocial disasters reproduce and reinforce social injustices.”278 
Thus, social inequality correlates with vulnerability to disaster. 
                                                                                                                      
272 See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human 
Condition, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1, 8 (2008) (contending that human vulnerability is not a 
pathological condition, but rather “a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human 
condition that must be at the heart of our concept of social and state responsibility”). 
273 See Austin Sarat & Javier Lezaun, Introduction: The Challenge of Crisis and Catastrophe 
in Law and Politics, in Catastrophe: Law, Politics, and the Humanitarian Impulse 1, 3 
(Austin Sarat & Javier Lezaun eds., 2009) (“[D]isasters might end up exacerbating ine-
qualities and discriminations, but, at the very least, they can serve to make the plight of 
vulnerable and underprivileged groups strikingly visible, by manifesting inequality in the 
rawest, most unadulterated way.”). Put differently, natural events have the potential to 
become disasters to the extent that human beings are vulnerable to them. See Matthew D. 
Adler, Policy Analysis for Natural Hazards: Some Cautionary Lessons from Environmental Policy 
Analysis, 56 Duke L.J. 1, 42 (2006) (“The term often used in the [social science] literature 
is population ‘vulnerability’: earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, droughts, tornadoes, and 
avalanches harm humans because of an interaction between a natural event and a human 
population that is ‘vulnerable,’ to some extent, to that event.”). 
274 See Susan L. Cutter & Christina Finch, Temporal and Spatial Changes in Social Vulnerabil-
ity to Natural Hazards, 105 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. 2301, 2301 (2008) (reporting on an 
empirical study of the historical variability in social vulnerability in the United States from 
1960 to 2000). Social vulnerability has been defined as “the sensitivity of a population to 
natural hazards and its ability to respond to and recover from the impacts of hazards.” Id. 
275 See id. 
276 Susan L. Cutter, The Geography of Social Vulnerability: Race, Class, and Catastrophe, in 
Farber & Chen, supra note 22, at 120, 123–24. 
277 Kristin A. Bates & Richelle S. Swan, Through the Eye of Katrina: Social 
Justice in the United States 6 (2d ed. 2010) (“[A] social disaster can be triggered by a 
force of nature, such as a hurricane, but ultimately it is rooted in the choices that society’s 
members make and the prioritization of some lives over others.”). 
278 Id. at 7. To some extent, natural disasters strike regardless of the victims’ race, gen-
der, or social status, but “[i]f one were to draw a map of places in which disasters are most 
likely to strike, we would also be sketching at least an approximate map of places in which 
the vulnerable are most likely to be gathered.” See Sarat & Lezaun, supra note 273, at 3 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the politics of disaster inequality). 
2013] Disaster Tradeoffs: The Fifth Amendment, Takings, and Public Necessity 181 
 Removing disaster tradeoffs from the ambit of ordinary rule-of-law 
constraints would exacerbate preexisting inequalities. Rather than rein-
force the public necessity defense, we should reject it. The defense is 
pernicious, in part because it rests upon the faulty assumption that 
those who lose their home and possessions are equal in social status to 
those whose property is thereby protected, to say nothing of the judges 
and legislators who decide what compensation, if any, is owed. The as-
sumption that pre-disaster conditions are neutral lacks empirical sup-
port on two levels. First, there is no evidence to support a claim that 
those whose interests are sacrificed—the rural poor, for instance— 
stand on equal social, economic, or political footing with larger com-
munities whose interests often take precedence. Second, the majority 
of those exposed to harm are often the most vulnerable in society and 
lack the social and economic means to self-insure against possible 
loss.279 
 In the wake of Hurricane Sandy in October 2012, for instance, new 
attention has been paid to the notion of erecting sea barriers to protect 
Manhattan.280 Yet, water diverted by a barrier will, inevitably, go some-
place else.281 In this regard, it is notable and troubling that “Wall Street 
is worth vastly more, in dollar terms, than certain low-lying neighbor-
hoods of Brooklyn, Staten Island and Queens—and that to save Man-
hattan, planners may decide to flood some other part of the city.”282 
Tradeoffs, it seems, may be made in the midst of disaster or embodied 
in plans that would shield high-priced neighborhoods from flooding 
while raising floodwater by as much as two feet elsewhere.283 The an-
swer is not to shy away from disaster preparation, but is rather to ensure 
that the decision-making process is inclusive and that the state accepts 
responsibility for those tradeoffs that cannot be averted. 
 Thus, to talk about disaster is also to talk about social structures. 
Disaster law and policy necessarily encompasses questions of social jus-
                                                                                                                      
279 See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 71, at 1473 (“Too often, those who suffer most are 
the poorest members of society—those who lack either the ability to evacuate from a 
floodplain or the financial means to settle in less vulnerable areas.”). Some observers con-
tend that federal flood control efforts and compensation schemes actually create perverse 
incentives that increase the number of floodplain residents. See id. 
280 See McKenzie Funk, Deciding Where Future Disasters Will Strike, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 
2012, at SR9. Hurricane Sandy caused significant damage to New Jersey, New York, and 
other parts of the eastern United States. See Andy Newman, Hurricane Sandy vs. Hurricane 
Katrina, N.Y. Times City Room Blog (Nov. 27, 2012 4:17 PM), http://cityroom.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2012/11/27/hurricane-sandy-vs-hurricane-katrina/. 
281 See Funk, supra note 280. 
282 Id. 
283 See id. 
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tice, because effective disaster planning seeks to mitigate vulnerability. 
Identifying structural factors that put individuals at greater risk or in-
fluence their ability to respond to disaster can help guide decisions 
about risk allocation in disaster planning and response.284 Questions of 
social justice cannot be set to the side in the wake of a disaster, because 
awareness of social inequality is integral to understanding the harm 
that has been caused.285 Disasters’ harms fall unevenly according to 
wealth, race, gender, social status, and other factors.286 
Conclusion 
 Affected landowners deserve recompense when the state destroys 
their property in the context of a broader disaster response. Yet, the 
federal government, along with some state governments, continues to 
invoke the doctrine of public necessity to absolve itself from any re-
sponsibility for costs imposed on private parties through deliberate 
flooding, controlled burns, and other measures taken in the midst of a 
crisis to protect the public.287 The government’s real involvement, how-
ever, begins before the onset of any particular disaster and includes 
choices concerning the zoning of residences and businesses, the con-
struction of levees, reservoirs, and dams, and other activities that affect 
a community’s vulnerability to disaster. 
                                                                                                                      
284 See Susan L. Cutter, The Vulnerability of Science and the Science of Vulnerability, 93 An-
nals Ass’n Am. Geographers 1, 6 (2003) (discussing the value of vulnerability science in 
developing risk, hazard, and disaster reduction policies). 
285 See Cutter, supra note 276, at 120 (contending that disaster response failures follow 
from “failures of the social support system for America’s impoverished—the largely invisi-
ble inner city poor”). 
286 See Adler, supra note 273, at 42 (“Social science data is, of course, crucial to natural 
hazards risk assessment. The term often used in the literature is population ‘vulnerability’ 
. . . .”). 
287 See generally TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 98 (2012) (finding the 
government not liable for damaging property in efforts to prevent wildfires from spread-
ing and discussing the necessity defense); Bass v. Louisiana, 34 La. Ann. 494 (1882) (de-
clining to provide compensation for government-inflicted damage to land resulting from 
construction of a levee); Atken v. Vill. of Wells River, 70 Vt. 308 (1898) (same); Short v. 
Pierce Cnty., 78 P.2d 610 (Wash. 1938) (providing no compensation for government in-
flicted damage to property in the course of controlling floodwaters). These cases adhere to 
the general view that there is no duty to compensate the owner of property damaged or 
destroyed in situations of public necessity. See Cohan, supra note 2, at 691–94 (discussing 
the public necessity doctrine and the issue of compensation). “Where the danger affects 
the entire community, or so many people that the public interest is involved, that interest 
serves as a complete justification to the defendant who acts to avert the peril to all.” 
Keeton et al., supra note 30, § 24. 
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 Moreover, although public officials need wide latitude to manage a 
disaster response, authority to act is not itself a justification for with-
holding payment for damages caused along the way. Indeed, the moral 
obligation to compensate for harm done was evident even in 1927 
when New Orleans sought to deluge its neighbors to escape danger and 
agreed that it would make whole their losses—a promise conveniently 
forgotten. Adhering to the principle of just compensation—whether 
instituted via statute or judicial reinterpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Takings Clause—would preserve the government’s emergency 
powers in full while reaffirming the rule of law and advancing the in-
terests of social justice. 
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